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ABSTRACT
This thesis is an analysis of the urban policies in Egypt since 1974.
The historical roots of early centralization and primacy are
described. So too are current trends in urban population
concentration and concentration-related problems.
Also evaluated are recent urban policies, key studies and development
schemes in Egypt, the constraints affecting the implementation of
urban policies, and the special problems of the new towns.
A key conclusion of this thesis is that the decentralization policy
adopted by the Egyptian Government is not achieving its goals in the
planned time-frame. Decentralization of large urban areas will be
futile unless accompanied by improved planning and administration and
more effective rural development policies.
Thesis Supervisor: Lloyd Rodwin
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INTRODUCTION
In Egypt, there is a widely accepted view that the larger cities
have developed beyond optimal size, and that natural or market forces
are incapable of bringing about an efficient pattern of national
settlement. In 1974 the Egyptian Government adopted policies aimed
at slowing down the growth of the largest (primate) city, Cairo,
encouraging the growth of smaller cities and promoting
decentralization. This thesis explores the types of urban policies
adopted by the Egyptian Government to deal with the issue of urban
concentration and primacy. It is not an attempt to discuss the
primacy phenomenon in general.
The first chapter presents the origins and impact of population
centralization. It briefly demonstrates the history of centralization
in Egypt to serve special driving needs. Current trends of growth in
concentrated urban population and the processes that are producing
such growth are reviewed. The chapter provides an analysis of the
problems that occur with population centralization under a strained
economy. It also examines the phenomenon of the conversion of
agricultural land to urban uses.
The second chapter discusses the main forces propelling policy-
makers in Egypt to develop the current urban policies. The chapter
evaluates these policies and considers how such policies evolved, what
goals were established, what methods were employed, and what
difficulties might complicate the achievement of such goals in the
near future.
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The third chapter examines and evaluates the short-term effects
of one aspect of the Egyptian urban policy, namely the current New
Towns policy. The location, projected size, costs and standards,
development control, organization and management requirements, among
other aspects of the policy, are evaluated.
The final chapter presents an analysis of the strengths and
weaknesses of the urban policies adopted by the government since 1974.
The chapter provides a framework for discussing trends and policies
that are likely to have an impact on the future of Egypt's larger
cities.
The chapter offer an analysis for why the decentralization policy
that has been adopted by the Egyptian Government is not achieving its
goals in the planned time-frame, and how it is crucial for the
government to realize that centralization and primacy in Egypt are
outcomes of a long history and were developed to serve driving
economic, political, and social needs. Lack of persistence in the
administration, coupled with conflicting policies, resulted in urban
policies that are not well examined or agreed upon views about
economic, political, social and cultural goals, and therefore, the
achievability of the set goals is questioned.
2
1. CENTRALIZATION AND URBAN GROWTH
This chapter presents the current status of Egyptian urban
concentration and its development over the years. The chapter is
divided into four major sections: the first summarizes the origins
and impact of centralization on Egypt; the second shows the current
trends in urban population concentration and the processes that have
produced such growth; the third documents and analyzes the problems
associated with Cairo's growth under a tight and troubled economy; the
fourth examines the phenomenon of the conversion of agricultural land
to urban uses. These four characteristics of urban Egypt are
interrelated and they highlight the need for a national urban policy.
1.1. ORIGINS AND IMPACT OF CENTRALIZATION
Historically, Egypt has had a highly centralized system of
settlement patterns and government administration. This tendency has
been reinforced by a homogeneous population, uniformity of agricultural
techniques, ease of communication along the Nile Valley and defense
requirements. These factors have been conductive to the development
of a centralized government to control resources, especially the Nile
River, and to assure the safety of the peasants.
The dominant factors which have influenced the urban patterns of
modern Egypt have been its natural resources and the geo-political
strategies that affected the economy.
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Table 1 presents the historical population growth trend in Egypt
and its cities of over 100,000 population. This growth has fluctuated
over the years due to war and economic changes. The Egyptian
population has always settled where the most suitable land for
agriculture was found, which is mainly along the Nile Valley. Since
1820, large cities evolved and continued growing until recent times
with several cities reaching the 100,000 population level. Cairo and,
later on, Alexandria became the major urban centers in Egypt.
Map 1 shows Egypt's governorates.
1.1.1. Natural Resources
Situated in northeast Africa, Egypt is essentially a desert of
almost 1,001,449 square kilometers (sq.km.). As shown in Map 2, Egypt
has four main geographical regions: the Nile Valley and the Delta;
the Eastern Desert; the Western Desert; and the Sinai Peninsula.
Until modern times, this desert has been uninhabitable except for the
Nile Valley.
The Nile Valley and Delta contain most of Egypt's agricultural
land. The Nile flows through the country for 1,540 km., forming an
extremely fertile valley between the parallel ranges of hills. From
Cairo northward, the Nile fans out into two branches, the Damietta and
Rosetta branches, which form the Nile Delta. The Nile Valley
represents about 4% of Egypt's total area, yet holds approximately 95%
of the population, 25% of which live in Cairo and 10% in Alexandria.
The Delta contains 70% of the entire population.
4
HISTORIAL SURVEY
TABLE 1
OF THE TOTAL POPULATION OF EGYPT
AND THE POPULATION LIVING IN CITIES OF 100,000 OR MORE
POPULATION IN PERCENT OF
TOTAL CITIES OF TOTAL CITIES OVER
YEAR POPULAT ioN. 100.000 b/ POPULATION 100.000
(000) (000)
2000 B.C. 5.000 100 2.00 Memphis
1400 B.C. 6.000 100 1.67 Thebes
100 A.D. 7.000 400 5.71 Alexandria
400 8,500 200 2.35 Alexandria
600 9.000 200 2.22 Alexandria
1000 9.000 250 2.78 Cairo, Alexandria
1200 9.000 545 6.06 Cairo. Tinnis, Qift,
Qua
1400 7.500 570 7.60 Cairo. Qus
1600 5.000 400 8.00 Cairo
1800 2,439 263 10.57 Cairo
1621-26 4.230 219 5.20 Cairo
1846 5,290 421 7.96 Cairo, Alexandria
1882 6.810 606 8.90 Cairo. Alexandria
1896 9.749 906 9.29 Cairo, Alexandria
1907 11,287 987 8.74 Cairo. Alexandria
1917 12,750 1.288 10.10 Cairo, Alexandria
1927 14.218 1.936 13.60 Cairo. Alexandria. Port
Said
1937 15.933 2.250 14.14 Cairo, Alexandria. Port
Said
1947 19.021 3.850 20.24 Cairo, Alexandria. Port
Said. Tanta.Mhalla
Suez, Mansoura
1960 25,980 7,117 27.39 Cairo. Alexandria: Port
Said. Tanta. 'lahalla.
Suez. Mansoura. Ismailia.
Assiut, Damanhour.
Zagazig. Fayoum
1966 30.080 9.132 30.36 Cairo, Alexandria. Port
Said. TantaMahalla
Suez, Mansoura. Ismailia,
Assiut. Damanhour.
Zaaazig. Fayou. Aswan,
Minya
1976 36.526 12,009 32.88 Cairo. Alexandria. Port
Said. Tanta. Mahalla,
Suez, Mansoura. Ismilia,
Assuit. Damanhour. Zaga-
zig, Fayoum, Aswan.
Minya, Giza, Shoubra El
Kheima, Kafr eI Dawar,
Beni Suef. Shebin el
Kom, Sohag
SOURCE: PADCO, National Urban Policy Study, Urban Growth and Urban Data Report, 1982, pp.5.
MAP 1
EYGPT'S GOVERNORATES
ImstraSAso ISA
ALM*KA
-BAEB
canaL
SOURCE: Bayad, Mohsen, "Housing and Urban j
Development in Egypt", Ph.D. dissertation
submitted for the Candidate Architect
Degree, The Royal Danish Academy of Art, 1979, pp. 24 .
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MAP 2
EGYPT'S GEOGRAPHICAL REGIONS
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
ALEXANDRIA
LOWER E
i
I
ij
WESTERN DESERT
ij
i
i
SOURCE: Adapted from PADCO, National Urban Policy
Study, Final Report, Vol. 1, 1982, pp. 2.
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The Eastern Desert region comprises 21% of the total area of
Egypt. It has mineral resources of oil, iron, copper, manganese, and
phosphate. Scarce water resources are formidable constraints upon
urban development throughout the Eastern Desert region. Both the
quantity and quality of water restrict development to only a few
locations: along the Eastern Costal Belt Zone, within the Western
sedimentary Belt Zone, and in Wadi Araba Depression. These have not
yet proven to have the long-range reliable water resources necessary
to establish a significantly large permanent population.
The Western Desert region makes up 69% of the total area of
Egypt. Mineral resources contained in this region are iron,
phosphate, gypsum, oil and natural gas. Over 40% of the Western
Desert is covered by sand dunes and it has several inhabited
depressions, creating oases in the desert. There is some prospect for
additional urban development in the Western Desert region as ground
water in the New Valley and the eastern Oweinat sector in the
southwestern corner of Egypt of the Nubian region would allow small
agriculturally-based communities to be located in the area.
The Sinai Peninsula occupies approximately 6% of the total area
of Egypt. Its mineral resources are oil, manganese, and coal.
Limited ground water resources constrain development in this
peninsula.
1.1.2. Political Administration and Economy
Although the locations of most of the urban settlements in Egypt
were determined much earlier in history, the last 200 years have seen
8
the interaction of the major economic and political factors that have
determined the size and function of current urban settlements. Urban
settlements have either grown, declined, stagnated or shifted
according to the principal functions the settlements perform.
1.1.2.1. From 1800 to 1882
During the period from 1800 to 1882, when Egypt was predominantly
under the rule of Mohammed Ali, the country's agricultural production
increased twelvefold due to horizontal expansion, intensive cropping,
and major irrigation works. Mohammed Ali also started an ambitious
industrialization plan during this period.
These events caused important changes in urban areas. For
example, Alexandria, where many military and naval industries were
located, grew tremendously from a population of 8,000 in 1808 to
164,000 in 1846. With the completion of the Mahmoudia Canal, linking
it to the Nile, Alexandria became the main port to Europe and replaced
Damietta and Rosetta, whose functions declined to fishing, craft
industries and port facilities for limited exports to countries east
of the Mediterranean. Although technical and administrative
activities were located in Cairo, it declined in the face of
Alexandria's commercial competition.1 Alexandria continued to grow
until it became the second largest city in the country.
Other cities noted for their small but successful textile
industries declined due to the bureaucracy and fiscal policies
established by state monopoly during this period.2
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In addition to agricultural and industrial development,
transportation also contributed to changes in the settlement patterns
between 1800 and 1882. The construction of the railroad in the Delta,
for example, contributed to the emergence of the mercantile centers in
agricultural areas such as Tanta, Damanhour, Zagazig and Mansoura.
These Delta towns continued to expand at rates greater than those of
either the total or urban population of the country.3 The railroad is
still essential in Egypt for the transportation of people and goods.
A significant event during this period was the digging of the
Suez Canal. Begun in 1854 and completed in 1869, the Suez Canal
immediately presented a challenge to the growth of Alexandria, because
it provided a faster alternative route to the rail transshipment line
of Suez-Cairo-Alexandria. The Canal created two new major urban
settlements, Port Said and Ismailia. It was a major contributing
factor in the development of Suez -- currently one of the largest
cities in Egypt. The Canal also contributed to major economic,
political, and cultural changes in Egyptian life, as it incurred of
large foreign debts which were responsible for foreign (British)
interference in the country.
1.1.2.2. From 1882 to 1922
The period from 1882 to 1922 saw the emergence of the issue of
political centralization. This period was also characterized by the
substantial growth of Cairo into a modern metropolis.
Cairo has been the capital for Egypt for over 1,300 years by
reason of its strategic location in the Nile Valley between the Upper
10
and the Lower Egypt, which was important for defense factors. Another
factor that contributed to its primacy was a natural outcome of
policies pursued under colonial rule.
It was essential for colonists to consolidate their power in a
few large cities in order to maintain an effective control over the
entire country. It was also essential to establish means of
commercial exploitation by securing a centralized mode of
administration over the colonial economy. From this organizational
necessity arose a concentration of both economic activity and
administrative power that constituted the seeds of a primate mode of
urbanization in the post-colonial era.
The British, starting in 1882, appointed central government
officials for each province, reporting to the Minister of Interior.
Districts were headed by police officers and villages by a local head
official also serving under the Ministry of Interior. The main
purpose of local government was limited to preserving law and order.
For generations, individuals and their descendants often continued to
administer their villages as representatives of the central
government.4
This hereditary system caused weaknesses in the local government
since the most qualified administrators usually did not have an
opportunity to use their abilities in government. Strong central
government became an important factor in encouraging Cairo's primacy.
With a limited power invested in the provinces, Cairo, as the
seat of national government, responded to economic opportunities to
become the hub of international commerce. It attracted foreign houses
of commerce and industry, as well as foreign professional expertise,
11
educational missions hosted other manifestations of Western culture.
Cairo's growth was also promoted by the administrative machinery
established by the British occupants; working with or for foreigners
attracted migrants from provincial towns and rural areas,5
In a period of 15 years, from about 1880 to 1895, Cairo's
population grew 52%, while other cities increased collectively by only
38%. Cairo's share of urban growth was about 44% and its population
equaled 37% of the total urban population; Cairo was growing at an
annual rate of 3.5%.6
1.1.2.3. From 1922 to 1952
Throughout the 20th century, the Egyptian Government has
continued to be highly centralized and local government has maintained
a "top-down" approach. Egypt experienced the two world wars, a period
of unprecedented economic boom, as well as the devastating depression
of 1929 to 1936.
Despite considerable investment in irrigation works, inefficient
land management reduced agricultural productivity. Also, the
difficulties of importing goods, supplies and machinery led to severe
shortages in domestic production and the loss of indigenous industrial
employment.
The fluctuations of this period in agriculture and in industry
influenced urbanization in Egypt in various ways. Although
agricultural productivity started to show decline, the significant
expansion of cropped areas delayed the rural migration to the towns
until after World War II.7
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The new industrial activity during and between the two world wars
caused growth in some urban centers at the expense of others. The
boom which preceded World War II favored the location of industry in
larger cities of Alexandria, Cairo, and in the larger of the Delta
cities of Mahalla, Kafr El-Dawar, Kafr El-Zayat, Suez and Ismailia.8
The availability of infrastructure and labor supplies were the main
reasons industries chose to locate in these cities.
Subsequently, Cairo's expansion was due to the rapid development
beginning in the 1940's of its industrial suburbs as well as its
residential suburbs. Administrative annexations of smaller
settlements and extensive transportation links to its environs started
to make Cairo a multinucleated agglomeration.9
The British military establishments located in the Canal Zone,
Cairo and Alexandria attracted streams of migrant workers from rural
area provincial towns, especially from Upper Egypt, who found economic
opportunities in servicing the army. This resulted in an explosive
growth of employment in the tertiary sector; Ismailia and Suez tripled
their populations. 1
Between 1917 and 1947, the gap between the country's population
growth (67%) and the growth of cropped land (20%) widened, resulting
in greater migration from the country to the cities. From 21% in
1917, the urban ratio grew to 30% in 1947, with no sign of decline.
1 1
1.1.2.4. From 1952 to 1971
From the early 1950's to the present, internal and external
political events took place which affected the development of economic
activities in the country and, as a result, increased Cairo's primacy.
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The first event was internal: a military revolution in 1952,
which put a new government into power. It faced dismal social and
economic inequalities in the country. To address these problems, two
approaches were considered by the new government: to increase the
productive capacity through industrialization, and to increase
agricultural capacity by reclaiming additional agricultural land.1 2
The primary objective was modernization.
The new government's investment policies increased Cairo's
primacy. The intended investment for industry was to be 46% in urban
areas and 53.1% in rural areas. The rural investment was almost
equally distributed over the non-urban governorates in the country.
The investment in urban areas was to be concentrated in Cairo,
Alexandria, Suez and Mahalla El-Kubra - the four urban areas which
already accounted for about 50% of the industrial workers in the
country 13
Industries were located in the rural hinterland of urban areas
nearest available infrastructure and adequate labor supplies. During
this period the government did not forbid building on productive
arable land. Several large public housing projects and industries
initiated by the government were built on arable land.
The loss of arable land through conversion to urban uses began to
be significant during this time. This was an extremely important
factor in the Egyptian economy. Having agriculture resources
inadequate for its population forced Egypt to import large amounts of
food, and made it impossible for Egypt to develop as a permanent food
exporter.
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In the agricultural sector, new land reform laws designed to
redistribute land ownership more equitably did not achieve the goal of
providing a stimulus to economic development. In a series of laws
during the period from 1952 to 1956, the rent for agricultural land
was fixed at a very low rate, the conditions of tenure and
sharecropping was put under government's control. Pricing policies
were introduced in this period, and they still control the prices of
crops at a lower value than market prices. In addition, the maximum
ownership of agricultural land was limited to 200 feddans for each
family (1 feddan is 4,200 square meters "sq.m.", almost 1 acre). Such
laws contributed to the reduction of land holdings, a result that
eventually slowed the growth of agriculture and increased rural-urban
migration. Not only were people, especially those with large
families, driven to seek employment opportunities in the cities, but
agricultural production and efficiency were limited by the small size
of permissible land holdings.
There was no intention to increase the per capita income for the
agricultural sector, but there was an intention to increase the per
capita industrial income during this period. In 1959 to 1960 the
industrial income was about 3.5 times its agricultural equivalent, and
in 1970 it was expected to increase, according to the plan, to 5.5
times the agricultural income. Such differentials, when the major
urban areas still had the majority of investment, could hardly stem
migration flows from the rural areas to the urban industrialized
centers of Cairo, Alexandria, and Suez. 1 4
The second political event contributing to Cairo's primacy was
external. The ambitious development projects of the new regime faced
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many financial difficulties. To increase agricultural capacity by
reclaiming additional agricultural land, the government embarked on
building the High Dam at Aswan. It was extremely difficult for the
government to construct the High Dam without foreign investment.
Western Europe and the U.S.A. refused to offer aid or loans to the new
government, compared with what the Socialist countries offered Egypt,
especially the U.S.S.R. This led to greater Soviet influence in the
Egyptian development strategy from the late 1950's to the early
1970's, transferring the bureaucratic and centralized Soviet model to
Egypt.
Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal as a reaction toward the
Western countries who did not agree to finance the High Dam. This led
to the third internal political event affecting the national economy
and Cairo's growth -- the 1956 War, which resulted from the military
attack by Britain, France, and Israel. These war conditions forced
the government to have high military spending which in turn limited
the amount of investment available for industry and agriculture. This
led to further concentration of the urban population as rural areas
lost the small share of national investment devoted to such vital
concerns such as irrigation systems and infrastructure. The
deflection of moneys into military spending also meant that the cities
were deprived of the development of infrastructure adequate for its
ever increasing population, resulting from high rate of natural
increase and rural-urban migration.
Beginning in 1960, as a result of Soviet influence, a sweeping
wave of socialist measures soon transformed the Egyptian economy.
These measures included massive nationalization, further land
16
redistribution, and severe limitation on capital movement and foreign
exchange transactions. The administrative apparatus in Egypt was
insufficient to manage and coordinate this tremendous increase in the
size of the public sector. The bureaucracy lacked the technical
expertise, the experience, and the incentive necessary for this effort
to succeed. Further complicating the picture was Cairo's increasing
growth at this time.
The 1967 War with Israel caused a sudden mass evacuation of the
urban population away from the battlefront of the three Canal cities,
mainly to Cairo, Alexandria, and the Delta cities, thus contributing
to their growth. The closure of the Suez Canal - the main foreign
exchange earner at the time - and the enormous military burden left
the economy incapable of coping with the demands of a 3% annual
population growth. The capital allocated for urban improvements was
reduced.
The policy choices adopted during this period (1952 to 1971) were
ultimately far more expensive than Egypt's limited resources could
accommodate on a sustained basis. Massive nationalization minimized
the private investment in industry and in agriculture. Also, the
capital available for development was extremely limited due to the
small amount of foreign investment and the high military spending
during this period. All the above factors crippled overpopulated and
resource-poor Egypt from developing during this period.
1.1.2.5. From 1971 to 1981
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By the time a new government came to power under Sadat in mid-
1971, the Egyptian economy was at a breaking point. After the 1973
War with Israel, the country was experiencing a weakening of its
economy and a general deterioration of the services provided to the
public. A radical change in structural economic conditions was
imperative. This change would occur during a period of radical
overhaul of foreign policy orientations and commitments to the western
world. During these years Egypt witnessed three major changes.
The first change was due to the increase of oil prices which
resulted in higher foreign exchange to the country. The second major
change in government policy was the establishment in 1974 of Infitah,
the "Open Door" policy. Initially, this was designed to create
conditions attractive to local and foreign investment capital.
Subsequent legislation and government practice have expanded the
strategy to encompass extensive liberalization of the economy as a
whole. Almost all fields were opened to both foreign and Arab
investment, protection was provided against nationalization and
confiscation, and tax exemptions were granted. Laws passed in 1975 to
1977 provided additional incentives and opened new opportunities for
private Egyptian capital. The city of Port Said was declared a free
trade zone to encourage the reurbanization of the Suez Canal region.
Infitah and its associated policies succeeded in producing
substantial capital inflows into the country. Whether these funds
have helped create a sound basis for a Egypt's economic regeneration
is another matter. For the fact is, by and large, the government
failed to put these large capital inflows into productive use. With
continuing high military spending, the consumerism outburst caused by
18
the sudden liberization, and the flow of foreign investments primarily
into real estate and commercial services, only a small proportion went
into productive investment in industry, agriculture, and
infrastructural development. Despite a good performance in terms of
growth in Gross National Product (averaging 7% annually in 1975 to
1983), this new wealth has remained largely inaccessible to the mass
of the population.
Infitah nevertheless resulted in massive construction activity in
the country - especially in the Greater Cairo Region and Alexandria.
Migrants continued to flow from the Upper and Lower Egypt governorates
to Cairo, Alexandria, Port Said, Suez, and Ismailia.
With capital now available, in 1974 the government embarked on a
policy of decentralization of its population and economic activities
from the Nile Valley to the rest of the country. This involved the
construction of new towns. The government also considered the
development of the remote areas outside the Nile Valley and
established studies for the development of the Suez Canal Zone, the
Red Sea Coast, the High Dam Lake, the Sinai Region, the Northwest
Coast of Alexandria and the New Valley of the Western Desert. The
government relied heavily on foreign investments and borrowed large
debts in order to finance such mammoth projects.
The third change was the lasting peace treaty with Israel in 1979
which eliminated the war conditions that had been draining the economy
since 1948.
1.1.2.6. From 1981 to the Present
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The assassination of Sadat in 1981 the Egyptian economy to
stagnate. With a new government in power under Mubarak, foreign
capital flows in the country were sharply reduced. Foreign and even
local investors withheld their capital because, with a new government
in power, there was fear of investing in a potentially unstable
environment.
The foreign exchange revenues obtained from 1975 to 1984 were a
windfall, resulting mainly from remittances of expatriate workers, oil
exports, Suez Canal dues, and tourism. Over the past year each of
these revenues sources has declined significantly (see Table 2).
In addition, a sizable foreign debt has accumulated since the
economic opening to the West began in 1974; its servicing is today a
major additional drag on the economy. Total debt was estimated at $
34.5 billion at the end of 1985 (see Table 3). The nonmilitary debt
service in 1985 soaked up almost 32% of the country's foreign exchange
revenues.
The looming foreign exchange shortfall, coupled with a high
population growth and a poor economy, means that the implementation of
the planned urban policies is facing great difficulties.
1.2. CURRENT TRENDS IN URBAN POPULATION CONCENTRATION
Egypt's number one problem has often been cited as the rapid
growth of its population.15 This problem of congested population has
been associated mostly with the urban population. The country is
experiencing intense population pressure on land and living space in
the inhabited zones; as stated, its population of 50 million (1986)
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TABLE 2
FOREIGN EXCHANGE EARNINGS
(US$ billions)
1985
Worker Remittances
Oil Exports
Other Exports
Suez Canal Dues
Tourism
Total
3.3
2.6
2.1
1.0
.6
9.6
1986
2.2
1.2
2.0
.9
.3
6.6
SOURCE: Jabber, Paul, "Egypt's Crises,
America's Dilemma," Foreign
Affairs, Summer 1986, pp.961.
TABLE 3
FOREIGN DEBT BURDEN
(US$ billions)
1979-82
(average)
Total Debt 21.1
Civilian 16.5
Military 4.6
Total Debt Service 2
Principal 1.2
Interest 0.8
1983
27.7
20.3
7.4
3.2
1.9
1.3
1984
31.0
22.5
8.5
3.3
1.9
1.4
1985
34.5
25.3
9.2
3.3
1.7
1.6
SOURCE: Jabber, Paul. "Egypt's Crises, America's
Dilemma,
pp.969.
" Foreign Affairs, Summer 1986,
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occupies 40,000 sq.km. (only 4% of the country's territory). The
average density of the population in 1986 is 1270 persons per sq.km.
in the Nile Valley and the Delta -- one of the highest in the
world.16
Table 4 shows the increase in urban, rural and total population
for selected years from 1927 to 1976. Total population increased from
14 million in 1927 to over 36 million in 1976; respectively for these
years, rural population increased from 10.3 million to more than 20
million, while urban population increased from 3.7 million to about 16
million.
While the percentage of rural population decreased from 73.6% in
1927 to 56.1% in 1976, the urban population increased from 26.4% to
43.9% in the same period. The ratios of urban/rural and urban/total
for the annual percent increases and compounded growth rates show
distinctly that urban population has been growing faster than either
the rural or the total.
Table 5 shows that while urban population increased more than
sevenfold between 1907 and 1976, rural population increased by only
127% within the same period. This rapid shift towards urbanization
has taken place with no major additions to the network of urban
centers. No cities were established in Egypt since the opening of the
Suez Canal in the late 19th century and the construction of Port Said
and Ismailia. Past urban growth has thus been absorbed by existing
cities and by previously nonurban settlements.
The number of urban settlements and their share of urban
population has kept pace with this continuous growth. As Table 6
shows, the number of urban settlements has increased from 100 in 1974
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TABLE 4
POPULATION & URBANIZATION 1927 - 1976
(in 000's)
1927 1937 1947 1960 1966 1976
TrAL POULATICH 14,083 15,811 18,806 25,772 29,720 36,656
Rural 10.364 11,429 12,60/. 16.115 17.919 20,559
Urban 3,720 4,382 6,202 9,657 11.801 16,098
% Rural to Urban 73.6 72.3 67.0 62.5 60.3 56.1
% Urban to Total 26.4 27.7 33.0 37.5 39.7 43.9
AVERAGE GROWTH RATE
Average % Population
Change:
Total 1.23/yr 1.89/yr 2.85/yr 2.55/yr 2.30/yr
Rural 1.03/yr 1.03/yr 2.14/yr 1.87/yr 1..7/yr
Urban 1.78/yr 4.15/yr 4.28/yr 3.70/yr 3.66/yr
AVERAGE GROWMH RATE
Ccnpcund Anruial Growth
Rates:
Total 1.20 1.75 2.45 2.40 2.12
Rural 0.98 0.98 1.91 1.78 1.38
Urban 1.65 3.53 3.47 3.40 3.15
Ratio of Average %
Population Change:
Urban/Total 1.45 2.20 1.50 1.45 1.56
Urban/Rural 1.73 4.03 2.00 1.98 2.47
Ratio of Average
Growth Rate:
Urban/Total 1.38 7.02 1.42 1.42 1.49
Urban/Rural 1.68 3.60 1.82 1.91 2.28
SOURCE: PADCO, National Urban Poli cy Study,
Urban Growth and Urban Data Report,
1982, pp. 241.
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TABLE 5
POPULATION IN URBAN & RUPAL AREAS IN EGYPT IN CENSUS YEARS 1907 - 1976 1
Average Average Average
Annual Annual Annual
Urban Rate of 2/ Rural Rate of 2/ Total Rate of 2/
Years Population % Increase- Population % Increase- Population Increase-
1907 2,125,000 19 9,058,000 81 11,183,000
1917 2,640,600 21 2.20 10,029,700 79 1.02 12,670,300 1.26
1927 3,715,840 26 3.48 10,367,436 74 0.33 14,083,276 1.01
1937 4,382,083 28 1.66 11,429,001 72 0.98 15,811,084 1-.21
1947 6,202,316 33 3.53 12,603,510 67 0.98 18,805,826 1.75
1960 9,651,097 37 3.46 16,120,368 63 1.91 25,771,465 2.45
1966 12,036,787 40 3.75 17,687,212 60 1.56 29,723,999 2.41
1976-1/ 16,036,403 44 2.91 20,489,801 56 1.53 36,526,204 2.11
Excluding those outside the country and in the occupied zone on the census date.
2/ Average Annual Rates of Increase are calculated expotentially.
SOURCE: PADCO, National Urban Policy Study, Urban Growth and Urban Data Report, 1982, pp.70.
TABLE 6
DISTRIBJTION OF URBAN SETTLEMENT SIZES
(1927 - 1976)
Settlement 1947 1960 1966 1976
Size No. % No. % No. % No. %
>1,000,000 1 1.0 2 1.7 2 1.5 3 1.9
200,000 -
999,999 1 1.0 3 2.4 5 3.5 7 4.4
100,000 -
199,999 5 5.0 9 7.5 9 6.3 10 6.3
40,000 -
99,999 13 13.0 15 12.4 23 16.2 33 20.8
20,000 -
39,999 28 28.0 39 32.2 45 31.7 53 33.3
<20,000 52 52.0 53 43.8 58 40.8 53 33.3
TOTAI 100 100.0 121 100.0 142 100.0 159 100.0
SOURCE: PADCO, National Urban Policy Dtudy, Urban Growth
and Urban Data Report, 1982, pp. 241.
25
to 159 in 1976; their share of the total population increased from
31.4% to 43.5% during the same period. The data also show that
between 1947 and 1976 urban settlements larger than 1,000,000
increased their share of the total population and maintained their
high proportion of the total urban population.
Large cities (100,000-500,000) increased their share of both
total and urban populations. Although smaller cities (20,000-100,000)
doubled in population, their share of both urban and total population
decreased. The settlements smaller than 20,000 maintained their
number of inhabitants over the 30 year period of 1947 to 1976, but
lost their share of population substantially.1 7
Relative to their total numbers the distribution of settlement
sizes varied during that period as shown in Table 7. Figure 1 shows
the cumulative percentage share of urban settlements. The data show
that Cairo, Alexandria, Giza and Shoubra El-Kheima account for 56% of
all urban population in Egypt.
In 1976, the population of Egypt was 43.9% urban and 56.1% rural.
However, 33 settlements with a population larger than 50,000 account
for about 80% of the urban population. The 126 settlements smaller
than 50,000 accounts for the remaining 20% of the urban population and
serve a rural population in their hinterland which amounts to 75% of
the total rural population. The current natural growth rate is 2.3%
will result in about seventy million inhabitants in the year 2000, of
which 58% will be urban.
1.2.1. Processes of Urban Population Growth
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TABLE 7
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL POPULATION & OF URBAN POPULATION IN
EGYPTIAN URBAN SETTLEMENTS OF VARIOUS SIZES
(Percentages Rounded)
NUMBER OF CITIES PERCENT OF TOTAL POPULATION PERCENT OF URBAN POPULATION
URBAN
SIZE CLASS*
1947 1960 1966 1976 1947 1960 1966 1976 1947 1960 .1966 1976
PRIMATE 1,000,000 2 2 2 2 16.0 19.0 22.8 24.97 55.0 .5 55.75 56.67
LARGE CITIES (100,000-500,000) 5 12 14 17 3.0 6.4 7.3 8.08 12.0 17.1 17.83 18.34
SMALLER CITIES (20,000-99,999 41 54 68 86 9.5 9.3 8.4 8.36 24.1 2.1 20.54 14.07
SETTLEMENTS (LESS THAN 20,000 52 53 58 53 2.9 2.6 2.4 1.66 8.9 6.31 5.94 3.77
CITIES (50,000-99,999) 9 8 10 19 34 2.3 .15 7 12.0 . .2 6.16
LARGE TOWNS(30.000-49,99Q 13 20 31 39 2 5 3 97 4.17 0.0 9.9 L73 9.35
SMALL TOWS(20,000-29,999) 19 26 27 28 3 2.27 .9 1.0 9.7 56 4.35
TOTAL 100 121 142 159 31.4 38.9 40.9 3.47 100.0 100.0 00.0 100.0
SOURCE: PADCO, National Urban Policy Study, Urban Growth and Urban
Data Report, 1982, pp. 24 4 .
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FIGURE 1
URBAN SETTLEMENTS RANK & CUMULATIVE DISTRIBUTION OF SETTLENTS'% SHARE OF TOTAL URBAN
POPULATION. URBAN SETTLEMTNTS RAN.K AND % DISTRIBUTION OF URBAN-RURAL POPULATION IN
SETTLEMENT'S MARKAZ
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i
SOURCE: PADCO, National Urban Policy Study, Urban Growth and Urban Data Report,
1982, pp.244.
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Urban growth in Egypt is the product of three processes:
(1) natural increase, (2) internal migration, (3) change in the
administrative definition of an urban settlement and changes in city
boundaries.
1.2.1.1. Natural Increase
The process of natural increase (i.e. the difference between
birth and death rates) accounts for the largest proportion of Egypt's
urban growth. Natural increase accounted for 59% of the growth of
Egypt's total urban population during the period 1966 to 1976.18 The
annual rate of increase in urban centers is currently 2.3%. There are
no substantial differences between rural and urban natural growth
rates.
1.2.1.2. Internal Migration
The second process responsible for urban growth in Egypt is
rural-urban migration. As mentioned, while urban population increased
more than sevenfold between 1907 and 1976, rural population increased
by 127% within this period. This substantial difference between urban
and rural growth of the population is mainly due to internal migration
rather than to great differences in natural growth rates (see Table
5).
There is much emphasis in the literature on rural-urban migration
and especially on migration to the larger cities of Cairo and
Alexandria. However, there is also some urban-urban migration, urban-
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rural migration and even rural-rural migration. A 1979 internal
migration survey reported that 41% of all the sample of urban migrants
came from urban areas and 57.2% came from rural areas. From the total
sample of migrants, 74.7% were migrants to urban centers. Migrants to
rural areas represented 25.3% of the sample.1 9
This trend seems to continue as people are motivated to move to
new locations for a variety of reasons. Some of these reasons, having
to do with conditions in the original place of residence, are the push
factors while others, having to do with the expected characteristics
of the destination are the pull factors.
Push factors include demographic pressures caused by high natural
growth rates which result in high population density in rural
settlements, as density exceeds 1100 persons per sq.km. in six of the
sixteen agricultural governorates.20 Declining economic opportunities
and scarcity of adequate services are further increasing density.
Traditional Egyptian law dictates that land is divided among the
children. Combined with a high fertility rate, this leads to severe
land parcelling and a steady decline of productive land owned by a
single household. The land reform laws that were adopted by the
government during the 1950's to redistribute land ownership resulted
in 70% of all agricultural units being currently less than 0.43
hectares (ha.) in size, which in many cases is far too small to feed a
three-generation family.2 1
Another push factor is a result of direct government control over
the pricing of many crops. The prices farmers receive for these crops
are less than the true shadow price (see Table 8). Also as a result
of the government fixing the rents for agricultural land, tenants pay
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TABLE 8
ESTIMATED AGRICULTURAL RENTS1
Cotton Rice Wheat L.Ber. S.Ber. Tomatoes
Export Price
(1972-76,ton)
Farm Gate Controlled
Price (1976, ton)
Yield
(tons/harvest/acre)
Harvest Cost
Harvests/year
Annual Shadow
Rent
Annual Regulated
Rent
W.
600/800 120/200 60/120
480
3.5
45 50 3.5
.3 2.3
85
1/3
65
2/3
1.5 10
45 17
1/3 1/3
212/383
84
3.5
3.5
28
24
1/3
150-200 80-120
40
6
90
3
2400/3300
450
35
7
130
2
830/1400
420
1All monetary values in Egyptian pounds
SOURCE Wheaton, William C. and Hisanobu, Shishido. "An Economic Appraisal of the New Town's
Policy in Egypt", M.I.T.-Cairo University T.A.P. Program, 1978, p.8.
Oranges
the landlord only a fraction of the price of the produced crops. The
result is that the agriculture industry is not currently among the
popular investments.
Pull factors include the attractiveness of economic factors,
including greater employment opportunities and higher wages. They
also include the attraction of socio-cultural factors, greater
facilities for education, health and recreation, and concentration of
political power. In addition, the overall attractiveness of Cairo as
a center of culture and innovation, and of political, administrative
and economic power is an important factor for the potential migrant.
Most of the important institutions, services and industries of the
country are concentrated in Cairo.
Another pull factor that contributes to rural-urban migration is
the free public education from elementary school through college. A
large rural population joins urban centers for a college education and
later for jobs. There are large numbers of young men who join the
army which is located in urban areas. At the end of their service
they tend not to go back to their original local regions; they would
rather stay in urban areas for better job opportunities. That is the
reason that the government started to establish local universities and
local military bases in urban areas other than Cairo and Alexandria.
The "urban bias" 2 2 and the often noted dualism between cities and
rural regions in developing countries is extremely evident in Egypt.
The average annual household income in rural regions is LE 1600, which
is lower than in urban centers where it is LE 3600. (LE is the
Egyptian pound, LE 1.35 = $ 1 in 1986 according to the official
exchange rate and LE 1.85 according to the free market rate). The
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result is that there is an increasing pressure on farmers to migrate
to another community having a more diversified economic base. Spatial
imbalances and the social, economic and cultural implications of the
above have led to, and still lead to, an extensive out-migration of
population from rural areas, mainly into Cairo and Alexandria (see
Table 9 and Map 3).
It is important to detect the characteristics of these migrants
in order to identify people who are more apt to be physically mobile,
and determine the effect of migration on the receiving population.
A recent study compared migrants in Cairo and Alexandria to the
resident population of the two cities in terms of age, education and
occupation structures.
Migrants tend to be concentrated in young age groups, between 15-
29 years of age (see Table 10). They increase the labor force
participation rates in the cities as well as increase the proportion
of those in the reproductive age, which affects the overall birth
rates of the city. 23
There is a greater concentration of illiterates and those with
secondary and post-secondary among recent migrants to Cairo and
Alexandria, than for the total population. Younger migrants (15-24),
both males and females, tend to have more formal education than the
25-34 age groups. This is the age group that is attracted by the
available educational institutions in both cities.24
The occupations of recent migrants to the two largest cities do
not differ substantially from those of the receiving populations.
There is, however, slight concentration in top managerial and
professional occupations of migrants and great concentration in
service occupations.
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TABLE 9
PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION GROWTH OF URBAN AREAS BY
GOVERNORATES CAUSED BY NET MIGRATION
BETWEEN 1966 - 1976
Urban Areas I % Growth by Net Migration
City of Cairo
Qalyubia
Giza
Alexandria
Damiet ta
Dakahlia
Sharkia
Kafr El Sheikh
Gharbia
Beheira
Menouf ia
Beni Suef
Fayoum
Minia
Assiut
Sohag
Kena
Aswan
6.6 1
59.5 1
1 35.4
64.8 I
24.8 I
10.9
35.7
30.C
34.5
24.C
62.9
46.7
30.0
31.9
16.2
36.8
negative growth rate
36.7
12.5
SOURCE: PADCO, National Urban Policy Study, Urban
Growth and Urban Data Report, 1982, pp. 7 3 .
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MAP 3
PREVIOUS RESIDENCE OF RECENT MIGRANTS
(1971 - 1976)
URAL
SOURCE: PADCO, National Urban Policy Study, Urban Growth and
Urban Data Report, 1982, pp. 7 5 .
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TABLE 10
AGE STRUCTURE OF RECENT MIGRANTS
AND TOTAL POPULATIONS OF CAIRO &
(Five Years or Less)
ALEXANDRIA IN 1976'
Cairo AIeandria
Age Recent Total Recent Total
Migrants Population Migrants Populatia
0 - 4 12.0 11.7 11.8 11.8
5 - 9 6.2 11.0 6.1 11.2
10 - 14 7.8 12.8 7.3 12.8
15 - 19 20.0 11.9 21.4 11.6
20 - 24 20.1 10.4 20.7 10.6
25 - 29 12.5 8.3 12.4 8.5
30 - 34 6.4 6.5 6.1 6.7
35 - 39 4-4 6.0 3.9 5.5
40 - 44 2.9 5.5 2.7 5.4
45 - 49 2.3 4.3 2.3 5.t
50 - 54 1.6 3.9 1.6 4.2
55 - 59 1.4 2.4 1.4 2.3
60 - 64 1.0 2.3 1.0 2.5
65+ 1.5 3.1 1.4 3.1
TOTAL
POPUL.ATION 239,218 5.074.017 76.542 2.317,140
SOURCE: PADCO, National Urban Policy Study, Urban
Growth and Urban Data Report, 1982, pp.78.
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1.2.1.3. Administrative Decisions
The third process that contributes to urban growth is
administrative decisions which redefine rural-urban populations.
Egypt is divided into governorates, each governorate - other than the
urban governorates of Cairo, Alexandria, Port Said and Suez - is
composed of several districts called markaz. Each markaz has a
central administrative town that is defined as urban and several rural
settlements. Some villages, because of demographic, economic,
administrative, political or security reasons, may be redefined as
towns and be included statistically within the urban areas.26 Urban
centers may also change boundaries and annex small adjacent villages,
changing the size of urban population.
1.2.2. Differential Growth of Urban Areas
As Table 11 shows, the greatest urban concentration is currently
in the Cairo Metropolitan Region where 78% of the region's population
is urban. Cairo is Egypt's primate city since this population
represents about 45% of all the urban population of Egypt in the 1976
census (the most recent census). The second highest urban
concentration is in the Alexandria Metropolitan Region where 61% of
the region is urban and represents 18% of the total urban population.
The remaining 37% of the urban population is distributed among the
other six regions. Table 12 shows the percentage distribution of
urban population within each planning region and the proportion of the
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TABLE 11 I/
POPULATION DISTRIBUTION, URBAN & RURAL - 1976
Governorate
Cairo
Alexandria
Port Said
Suez
1smailia
Behei ra
Damietta
Kafr El Sheiki
Gharbia
Dakahlia
Sharkia
Menoufia
Qalyubia
Gi za
Fayoum
Beni Suef
Menia
Assuit
Sohag
Qena
Aswan
Red Sea
New Valley
Matruh
Sinai
TOTAL
RuralUrban
5,074,016
2,317,705
262,760
193,965
174,211
595,100
142,707
291,614
764,307
656,840
530,051
336,623
685,238
1,378,009
275,378
276,429
430,462
470,369
409,520
392,079
234,340
48,438
34,769
51,756
9,717
16,036,403
Total
5,074,016
2,317,705
262,760
193,965
353,975
2,464,445
576,326
1,407,160
2,293,240
2,737,306
2,617,938
1,710,849
1,680,837
2,416,659
1,141,879
1,110,132
2,054,105
1,697,422
1,924,814
1,709,299
618,518
55,415
85,175
112,547
9,717
20,589,801 36,626,204
Population present at census date, does not in-
clude population abroad (1,425,000) and population
in occupied zone of Sinai (147,000).
SOURCE: PADCO, National Urban Policy Study, Urban
Growth and Urban Data Report, 1982, pp. 70.
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179,764
1,869,345
433,619
1,115,546
1,528,933
2,080,466
2,087,887
1,374,226
995, 599
1,038,650
866,501
833,703
1,227,053
1,227,053
1,515,294
1,317,220
384,178
6,977
50, 406
60,791
I
TABLE 12
PERCENTAGE OF URBAN POPULATION OF THE EIGHT
PLANNING REGIONS AND PERCENTAGE OF URBAN AND RURAL
POPULATION TO THE NATIONAL RURAL &URBAN
POPULATION IN 1976
% Urban % Urban to
to Region Naitional Urban
77.8
60.9
34.3
25.1
23.0
28.3
24.7
46.0
43.7
44.5
18.2
7.4
13.7
6.2
3.1
6.6
0.3
100
% Rural to
National Rural
9.9
9.1
11.0
31.7
16.1
6.2
15.7
0.3
100
SOURCE: PADCO, National Urban Policy Studv,
Urban Growth and Urban Data Report,
1982, pp.71.
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Region
Cai ro
Alexandria
Suez Canal
Delta
North Upper
Egypt
Assuit
South Upper
Egypt
Matruh
Egypt Total
region's urban and rural populations to the nation's urban and rural
population. The three governorates experiencing the highest rate of
urbanization are Giza, Qalybia and Qena.
1.2.3. Urban Concentration and Settlements
The urban population in Egypt, around 16 million in 1976, is
distributed in 152 urban settlements, of which there are four
different administrative types. The first type represents cities that
are also governorates (urban governorates): Cairo, Alexandria, Port
Said and Suez. The second type of urban settlement is city that is
the capital of the governorate; the third type is a town, capital or
center of a district or markaz. And the fourth type is a town that is
defined as urban and has no rural settlements administratively
attached to it, such as Faraskour in Damietta and Farshout in the
district of Naga Hammadi, governorate of Qena.
1.3. PROBLEMS OF CAIRO'S PRIMACY COUPLED WITH A TROUBLED ECONOMY
Greater Cairo consists of Cairo Governorate, some parts of Giza
Governorate, the city of Shoubra El-Kheima in the Qalubia Governorate,
as well as a few villages in the Nile Valley and the Delta. Currently
the population amounts to over ten million inhabitants. Assuming that
growth will continue at its present rate, the population of Greater
Cairo will reach 16.5 million by the year 2000.
Like many other primate capitals, Cairo reaped the benefits as
well as carried the burdens of socioeconomic and political change.
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Since 1900, the factors influencing growth and directions of growth
have multiplied in number and become much less controllable. Urban
activities sprawled in all directions, except the southeastern
direction where the new development on the Mokattam Mountain did not
prosper because of its relative inaccessibility.
While development in other directions continues, new growth
corridors following major transport routes to the northeast and
southwest are modifying traditional expansion patterns. Southwestern
development is being facilitated by new bridges across the Nile, by
Pyramid Road and new desert roads. The northeastern development
follows the light rail system to Heliopolis, the agricultural road to
Ismailia Canal, and the Egyptian rail system to suburban El-Marg.
Prime agricultural land to the north, west, and south gave way to
planned as well as unplanned urban growth bringing the total built-up
area to some 2900 sq.km. in 1977. Development to the east and west
are characterized by relatively lower density and are more orderly,
since they were undertaken by large private and public corporations on
government-owned land. On the other hand, extensions north and south,
in the direction of the area's main industrial agglomerations, were
chaotic. This is due in part to patterns of migrant settlement in the
area which led to uncontrolled small developments on privately owned,
fragmented farmland (see figures 2 and 3).
Whether the sheer growth of large urban concentrations like Cairo
is a problem or is desirable in itself is disputable.2 7 It has been
argued that large cities of developing countries are more likely to
generate net social benefits. It has also been argued that one cannot
tell whether a city is too large or too congested, or whether it is
merely poorly organized.28
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FIGURE 2
GREATER CAIRO DIRECTIONAL POPULATION GROWTH TRENDS
(1937 - 1976 BY KISM)
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Whether Cairo's growth is desirable from the national point of
view was not studied until 1968. The Egyptian Government assumed,
because of the internal problems of the area resulting from
concentrated population growth, that Cairo's growth was undesirable.
However, the national economic and industrial plans which Egypt has
had over the last thirty years were responsible for a major part of
Cairo's recent growth.
1.3.1. Housing Supply
Although the Cairo area is getting a relatively large share of
state and privately supplied housing, according to government figures,
there is an estimated national housing deficit of 3.5 million
dwellings in 1986. The government projects that there is a demand for
a further 1.6 million dwellings by the year 2000 in order to meet
population growth. Note that the above deficits are challenged by a
study on housing conditions in Egypt. Cite the study indicates that
there is no housing deficit in Egypt due to the large supply of the
informal sector housing.2 9
There are three major groups involved in the production of
housing in Egypt: the government, the formal private sector (those
who have building permits and build on legally registered land) and
the informal sector (illegal construction). The latter is illegal not
due to squatting, as the land is purchased from its owners -- but
because this type of construction is invariably in violation of the
laws regulating land subdivision, sale of lots, construction and/or
land use.3 0
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The public sector housing projects were built in the early 1960's
in the urban areas. The initial target groups were government
employees and industrial workers. Typically, public sector housing
consists of 45 to 50 sq.m. units containing two or three rooms with
private service facilities located in relatively low-density projects
consisting of five story walk-up apartment buildings. These units are
under rent control policies and tend to be rented at very low rents
which frequently do not cover the costs of collecting rents.3 1
Due to lack of revenues, partially due to these low rents,
maintenance in public housing projects has been minimal and the
condition of the housing has deteriorated much faster than if it were
well maintained.
Law No. 49 of 1977 established rental payments as contributions
toward the purchase price of public housing units. Under the
requirements of the law, tenants who had paid rent for fifteen years
became instant owners while other existing tenants had fifteen years
to complete payments for ownership.3 2
Although relatively little data about the beneficiaries of public
housing exists, one study performed in Helwan (an industrial suburb of
Greater Cairo) in 1978 gives a flavor of the types of beneficiaries
and their attitude towards their housing. Due to the special economic
conditions in Helwan, the bulk of householders in the study were
employed in industries located in Helwan. Rents tended to be quite
low, both in absolute terms (averaging LE 2.06 per month) and in terms
of total family income (only 3.8% of the total family monthly
income).33
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Total public sector construction (government plus public sector
companies) amounted to only about 6.6% of total housing construction
between 1966 and 1976.34 The public sector approach failed since it
could never produce a sufficient number of dwellings to meet demand.
The units produced were an uneconomic solution, as they created a
drain on the government from the high subsidies involved and the low
cost recovery.
The private sector supplied most of the housing in Egypt until
the late 1950's. Starting in the early 1960's, private investment in
housing construction has been discouraged and a housing shortage
emerged for the first time in Egypt. This was mainly due to rigid
government housing policies adopted after 1952, such as rent control,
laws prohibiting eviction, housing finance and the allocation of
building materials. Such laws contributed to the deterioration of the
housing stock in Cairo as well as in other parts of the country. Fear
of investment in housing construction was accentuated by the
expropriation of assets for nationalization and redistribution of
wealth in the late 1950's. As a result, condominiums were introduced
to cater to the demand of the higher income groups, and key money (a
compensation for discrepancies between real and estimated costs) were
levied illegally by most of the landlords.
The standards of private sector housing exceed those of public
sector construction. As Table 13 indicates, the formal private sector
is serving a very small group of upper income households, an
assumption which is also suggested by the small contribution made by
the sector to new housing construction between 1966 and 1976.35
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TABLE 13
INDICATIVE HOUSING PRODUCTION BY SECTOR, UNIT TYPE
AND INCOME GROUP SERVED, 1978
UNIT UNIT DISPOSABLE lOHSUMJD IMCDE
SIZE COST INCwE I/ OJARTILE/
SECI (m2) (L.E.) (L.E.) DECILE 2/
Public 70 3.500 1388 90F
80 /,000 1580
Private 90 5.000 1983 Over 90th %
Fornal 150 10.000 3966
Private
Informal 50 2.000 793 50th - 75th %
Based an 25 percent of incaire
percent capitalization rate.
allocated to housing and a 10
- QuartIle/DecIIe grows are base an 1975 est inmte by Professor
L. Taylor (M.I.T.)
SOURCE: PADCO, National Urban Policy Study, Urban
Growth and Urban Data Report, 1982, pp.414.
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As a result of the above, the relative smallness of the formal
private sector contribution to the newly constructed housing amounted
to 15% of total housing produced between 1966 and 1976. This
relatively small contribution resulted partly from the costs and
difficulties encountered in obtaining building permits and access to
legal subdivisions, and from the lack of long term financing.36
The informal sector has been responsible for 84% of the housing
built between 1966 and 1976 in the country.37 Although the informal
sector housing does not have access to subsidized building materials
as the formal sector does, and though it lacks building permits, the
standards and quality of the informal sector housing are relatively
high compared to the public sector housing.
In Shoubra El-Kheima and other areas, owners of agricultural land
began conversion of the area to urban uses when industrial pollution
of canals became too great for agricultural uses. Other land owners
began converting their farms to urban uses when surrounding
development of other urban uses began creating pressures on their
areas for middle and low income housing. 3 8
1.3.2. Urban Transport Networks and Traffic
Cairo's transportation networks largely reflect the patterns of
urban growth and the land uses and lifestyles which were current at
the time they were introduced. For example, in the old city, streets
are narrow and crooked and designed for pedestrians. In Garden City,
streets are narrow and winding, designed to provide access to the
villas which were once there. Each area and sub-area has its own
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pattern of development but a number of key features characterize
Metropolitan Cairo transport network.
According to a recent study, about 25% of Greater Cairo's total
urbanized area is road space but the practical traffic carrying
capacity is about 25% less than that achieved in developed
countries.39
There is a high percentage of unsurfaced roads in the city's
secondary and tertiary systems which is compounded by poor maintenance
and repair. Lack of traffic signs, signals and controls, aggravated
by a poor or no enforcement, further add to traffic problems.40
Public transport is operating at a high level of inefficiency --
about one-third of the operational fleet is unavailable for a variety
of reasons. The low quality and quantity of the public transit system
is due mainly to the low cost recovery provision of the service.
Improvements could be either directly from users (e.g., fares), or via
more general but related sources such as fuel taxes, vehicle taxes,
etc.
The burden on public transportation is further compounded by the
rigidities of the housing market: that is, the lack of residential
mobility as a result of supply shortages and regulations governing
rent and vacancy. Both of these factors result in irrational or
inefficient land use linkages and distribution patterns, creating a
great number of lengthy trips to and from work.
Among the various proposals to help relieve Cairo's
transportation crises is the subway. The idea of a subway was first
introduced in 1954 and has been debated ever since. Now the project
is being implemented. However, there is a serious question as to
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whether the underground is needed in the form proposed. It is passing
through areas already developed, and even if land use controls can be
effectuated, it is very likely that densities will rise even more
within these already crowded areas.
If there is a success in resolving the traffic problem but it is
implemented without good management and control, the primary problem
will grow and Egypt will need ever more costly solutions. Underground
transport systems enable more people to work in the same small area,
lead to ever higher buildings and greater densities, higher land
values, and more people and traffic, especially on the surface.4 1
For these reasons, alternative schemes for Cairo's transport
networks should be recognized. A number of consultant studies have
suggested that greater capacity in not really required in Cairo,
rather a better traffic management and improved public services are
needed, including better bus service and private para-transit
services.
1.3.3. Infrastructure
Life in Cairo is still marked by sewage overflowing in a number
of the city streets, power failures, and water shortage in many parts
of the city. The city's sewage and wastewater system was initially
built in 1914. It was extended once - in 1930 when the city's
population was only one-sixth of the present ten million inhabitants.
There is an estimated daily deficit of potable water that amounts to
35,000 cubic meters.4 2
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However, it was not until 1973 that the government initiated
infrastructure renewal projects for Cairo. The under-maintenance of
the system, coupled with the lack of extensions provided, make it very
difficult to rehabilitate. A new sewage system is now under
construction with a billion dollar cost, but the implementation of the
project is facing difficulties in finance and management.
There is a great waste of water in the urban areas, including
Cairo, which results from insufficient use. The low cost recovery of
water provision should be increased to finance upgrading the system.
1.3.4. Shortage of Other Facilities
There are other critical facilities shortages in Egypt today. A
1970 study indicated that the average hospital bed per patient ratio
is 3.28 beds per 1000 patients in Greater Cairo. The city had 44
child-care centers with an average of one center per 166,000
children.4 3
There were 143 post offices in the region, with an average of one
office per 36,000 persons.4 The average green area for a person
amounted to less than 1 sq.m. The above figures fall below any
reasonable standards, and the figures are much more critical in 1986.
Although all the problems cited exist in Greater Cairo and
Alexandria, census statistics indicate that conditions in those cities
are better than many other urban settlements in Egypt.
However, due to the size of both Greater Cairo and Alexandria,
their problems tend to overwhelm the problems of other settlements.
For example, although Greater Cairo had 73% of its households
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connected to water supply, the absolute number of persons not
connected is approximately 1.8 million, a population which is greater
than any other urban settlement outside the metropolitan areas.45
Even with under-maintenance of urban facilities such as
infrastructure (though under-maintenance was not as a result of
explicit government policies to stop Cairo's growth) there has not
been a decrease in Cairo's size.
1.4. URBANIZATION OF AGRICULTURAL LAND
Egypt's major economic asset is its productive agriculture.
However, high population growth and government policies have
contributed to a situation where the land base on which agriculture
depends is being threatened. Due to the government's rigid policies
of land redistribution which resulted in small landholdings,
controlling the pricing of crops, and of fixing the rent of
agricultural land, the conversion of arable land to urban uses is
extremely profitable to land owners. People are migrating from rural
areas in large numbers contributing to increasing urbanization which,
in turn, is impinging on the agricultural land base.
Egyptian land area is 238 million feddans, but only 2.5% of this
area is being cultivated. An estimated 5.9 million feddans are
presently being cultivated along the Nile Valley and the Delta area.
Per capita cultivated land has decreased from 0.48 feddan in 1907 to
0.15 feddan in 1975. Each year an estimated 40,000 to 60,000 feddans
of agricultural land are converted to nonagricultural uses. Thus, on
the order of 1% of cultivated land is being transferred annually from
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agricultural production to non urban uses according to official
data.4 6 As a result, Egypt is now a major food importer as the sum of
food imports amounts to ten million dollar every day. 4 7
Replacing lost value from urban encroachment will be difficult if
not impossible. The cost of reclaiming desert land amounts to LE
5.000 per feddan and, although it becomes productive after six
years,48 its fertility is much less than the Nile Valley's arable
land. The reclaimed land amounted to less than one million feddans
since 1952, including the major contribution of the Aswan Dam.4 9 The
productivity of new lands lags behind the lost urbanized productive
land. These factors combine to cast doubt on the possibility of any
value added from the loss of productive agricultural land. 50
This rapidly shrinking per capita supply of usable land resources
and the increasing fragmentation of agricultural land holdings has
resulted in increasing migration to urban areas.
Egypt's villages, many of which are over 20,000 in population,
are currently subjected to building permit requirements and land-use
controls. In spite of such laws, farmers continue, in large numbers,
to allow new housing to be built on farm land for a variety of
reasons. Primarily a change in the family structure, such as the
children's marriage, or the desire of a prosperous urbanite member of
the family to build a modern house and maintain roots in the village,
are responsible for such activity. Occasionally, small parcels of
land, usable only as building sites, are sold outside the family in
cases-of extreme financial distress. In the agricultural hinterland
of urban centers, the regulations, and severe penalties for violators,
are frequently not enforced, mainly because of the housing
shortage.51
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Urban population concentration, combined with urbanization of
agricultural land are two major problems forcing policymakers in Egypt
to develop a national urban policy. The following chapter will show
how the government is trying to deal with these pressing problems.
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2. RECENT URBAN POLICIES IN EGYPT
This chapter considers how the current urban policies in Egypt
evolved, what methods were employed, what goals were established, and
what constraints might complicate the achievements of such goals.
2.1. THE NEED FOR A NATIONAL URBAN POLICY
All countries are better off with a national urbanization
strategy that is the outcome of a careful national debate about
economic, political, social, and cultural goals.5 2
A national urbanization policy is especially important for
developing countries because the location of new economic activities
and the movement of population affect the efficiency of their national
economy and the stability of their political systems.5 3
The proper formulation of a national urbanization strategy
requires the systematic discussion of three major policy areas
affecting patterns of population distribution and national
settlements. The country must examine in turn: (1) the implicit
spatial effects and biases of national policies, (2) the appropriate
policies to deal with problems of very large cities such as congestion
and pollution, and (3) the problem of regional inequality and the
direct or explicit policy instruments for the redistribution of
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economic activity.
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The formulation of a national urban policy has four major
objectives: the full development of the national resources of the
country, the maintenance of national cohesion among various regions,
particularly in the case of very large disparities in per capita
output among regions, the prevention or correction of excessive
concentration of economic activities within the capital region, and
the more efficient and more equitable management of growth within
cities.5 5
In Egypt, the need for a national urban policy emerges from two
important and pressing factors: the concentration of population and
economic activities in only 4% of the country's area, and the
continuing loss of productive agricultural land.
2.2. THE HISTORY OF URBAN POLICIES IN EGYPT
Egypt showed no interest in spatial policies before the 1960's.
More recently, the relentless growth of the urban population and the
tendency for people to concentrate in the capital city have generated
much more concern for the future patterns of urban settlements in the
country.
The concentration of economic activities in a few urban areas in
the Nile valley and the tremendous annual loss of productive
agricultural land were seen by the Egyptian Government as requiring
the formulation of sectoral and spatial plans and programs to guide
the future growth patterns of urban settlements.
It was not until 1965 that the government paid serious attention
to spatial development policies. At first, it was Cairo's growth that
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called attention to the need for such policies. The difficulty in
maintaining physical and functional order in Cairo and of effecting a
socially acceptable regional balance of population in the country have
promoted investigations into the possibility of curbing the city's
growth. A committee studying the subject for the Greater Cairo
Planning Higher Committee (G.C.P.C.) in 1967 concluded that the
remedies were twofold: the first was to continue efforts to limit
population growth and establish policies to encourage migration to
other parts of the world. The second was to establish a national
policy of regional and urban development and to enhance and strengthen
the system of local government.5 6
Up until 1968, the pattern of regional development was largely a
function of the personality and leadership of governors and the
individual judgement of central departments and ministries. Policy
co-ordination was to be achieved through the Cabinet and several
permanent and ad hoc committees. In 1968 a cabinet subcommittee
recommended that an agency be created to study and define alternative
policies and to formulate a national policy on urban development.
This agency was to include the recently created G.C.P.C. (1965) and
the Alexandria Regional Planning Committee (1967) findings as
essential elements in the structure. One of the cabinet subcommittee
accomplishments was the creation of a general sympathy for the urgency
of a national urban policy.57
The committee recommended that the growth of the central urban
area around Cairo and Giza be limited to a maximum of 9.5 million
people with gross densities ranging from 225 persons per acre (55 ha.)
at 3.2 km. from the center to 50 persons per acre (123 ha.) at the
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fringes. Restructuring of land uses, densities and transportation
were all aimed at bringing into intensive development all the marginal
areas disrupted by dispersed urban growth and pockets of undeveloped
land within an established boundary.5 8
The plan was that population growth be gradually channelled into
three regions containing four new satellite cities for settlement
extension within Greater Cairo. The new cities' linear concept would
permit incremental and flexible development of up to one million
inhabitants each.
The plan represented the first effort in the country to deal with
the problem of urban population concentration and its impact on
agricultural land. It also laid down the foundation for the idea of
new towns as a feasible solution. However, for several years the plan
served only as a statement of policy without any serious effort to
implement its recommendations.5 9
The three regions of the Primary General Plan were: the Helwan
Region to accommodate three-quarters of a million people, a new town
along Fayoum Road, and a new town along Suez Road. As for the other
two new towns proposed, one would be located to the north of the Abu
El-Rawash area, and the other in the El-Khanka region to the northeast
of Cairo.60 The four new towns planned were to accommodate 25,000
persons by the year 1990.
The war situation did not allow the implementation or even the
planning of any spatial policies at a national level until 1974 except
for Law No. 70 of 1973.61 This law was established to divide the
country into eight regions: Greater Cairo, Greater Alexandria, Suez
and Sinai, Delta, Matruh, North Upper Egypt, South Upper Egypt, and
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Assuit. It was intended that an integration of economic and regional
planning would take place within and among these regions.
2.3. URBAN SPATIAL POLICIES SINCE 1974
After 1973, the Egyptian Government established its broad
national development objectives as the following:
* Sustaining a high rate of economic growth.
* Improving the standard of living of all Egyptians, with emphasis
on low income groups, through:
- Creating productive employment opportunities for the rapidly
growing population.
- Generating a sustained increase in real per capita income.
- Ensuring that public service and facility gains are
equitably shared by the Egyptian people.
* Achieving certain special objectives:
- Encouragement of the deconcentration of Cairo.
- Protection of arable land from urbanization.
- Demonstration of modernization and progress.62
The first step in implementing these goals was explicitly stated
by former President Anwar Sadat in April, 1974, in the "October
Working Paper":
"...the life of the Egyptian people cannot remain confined to the Nile
Delta and the narrow valley of the Nile...We cannot wait until the
population grows up to 40 or 50 millions before we begin to act...I
believe ...it is time for drawing a new map for Egypt. This cannot be
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achieved by scattered projects here and there. It can be done by
creating areas for population concentration and new economic
activities able to equal the pulling power of the capital."
He called for construction of new cities:
"...It has become important for Egypt to carry out new projects for
the establishment of new cities."
Former President Sadat's new map for Egypt also included the
development of the Suez Canal Region into an industrial, agricultural,
and tourist area. Other development strategies included extending
development along the Mediterranean and Red Sea coasts and developing
of the High Dam Lake, Sinai, and the New Valley.
The Egyptian Government was anxious to employ for this task
planning teams which would comprise foreign consultants with wide
international experience working in partnership with local
practitioners conversant with local requirements and practices. A
further concern was that much of the work be carried out in Egypt, for
it was felt that this would be helpful both in ensuring the continuing
relevance of the proposals and in providing counterpart experience for
the many Egyptian staff involved.
2.3.1. Construction of New Towns and Satellite Cities
The building of new towns has a long history in Egypt dating from
the time of the Pharaohs. In more modern times, Cairo, Alexandria and
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the Canal cities were originally planned as new settlements. However,
the concept of developing satellite communities in close proximity to
large urban complexes is of fairly recent vintage.
In most countries today new towns are viewed as an attractive
alternative to the congestion and socioeconomic problems associated
with overcrowding in the older cities. In Egypt new towns are also
associated with the need to open new territories and achieve an even
spread of the population outside the Nile Valley.
The history of new towns in the Greater Cairo Region is a worthy
of note. Heliopolis and Maadi were planned as satellite communities
and were intended by their designers to remain separated from the
urban mass of the city of Cairo. The major emphasis of these
satellite communities was to provide employment and residences outside
of Cairo. The purpose of those satellite communities was to lessen
the congestion in central city services, while still maximizing the
use of existing infrastructure wherever possible. Obviously this was
not achieved and even though the two communities still maintain a
great deal of their original character, they have been overtaken by
the spreading growth of the city. These two communities were not a
part of a regional plan that defined their role. In other words,
their establishment was not a reflection of a conscious policy
decision.
Two other developments were mistakenly thought of as new towns:
Madinet El-Awkaf, built in the late 1940's and Madinet Nasr built in
the early 1960's. There was no establishment of businesses or
services along with housing construction in these communities. They
were in planned extensions of the then existing urban grid and did not
possess any of the ingredients of new towns.
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There were no other new towns planned until in May, 1974 when the
Egyptian Government, represented by the Ministry of Housing and
Reconstruction, initiated a program of developing new cities to be
located outside the Nile Valley and the Delta.
In 1975, the government initiated the planning of both Tenth-of-
Ramadan City, 55 km. northeast of Cairo, and Sadat City, 95 km.
northwest of Cairo and halfway to Alexandria. In 1977 planning began
for New Ameriyah City, 40 km. southwest of Alexandria. All three
cities were planned to be self-contained.
The plans prepared for the three cities aimed for them to be
industrial ones, in order to create employment and economic
activities. The target population, based on proposed industrial
employment, was to be blue-collar workers.6 3
In 1977, a proposal was submitted to the People's Assembly
calling for the establishment of an Organization for the Development
of New Towns. In the fall of 1978, a new ministry was established and
charged with responsibility for the planning and development of new
communities.
In early 1979, the government decided to plan five new satellite
cities in the Cairo metropolitan area. These cities were planned to
be smaller than the three self-contained cities mentioned above, and
to be closely integrated with Cairo. These five satellite cities
were: Fifteenth-of-May City in Helwan, 35 km. south of Cairo, Sixth-
of-October City, 32 km. west of Cairo, El-Obour City, 30 km. northeast
of Heliopolis, El-Amal City, 50 km. east of Cairo's southern fringe
and Badr City, 45 km. north of Cairo. These new cities are now in
different stages of completion.
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2.3.2. Suez Canal Master Plan Studies
Master Plan studies were commissioned for Suez, Port Said and
Ismailia in 1974. There were two basic aims to these long-range
development plans: (1) to prepare programs for initial reconstruction
and (2) to prepare dynamic frameworks for the growth of the three
cities to a population of between 750,000 and 1,000,000 persons by the
year 2000.
The 1967 War resulted in tremendous upheaval and devastation to
the area of the Suez Canal, where concentrated bombardment and
fighting forced the virtual abandonment of the cities of Suez, Port
Said and Ismailia by 1969. A formerly prosperous region of Egypt was
put into a state of limbo and all but ceased to exist except for a
battlefront. The population was evacuated and settlements and
infrastructure were progressively destroyed.
The political and military stalemate was not broken until 1973,
by which time it was clear that a massive and urgent program of
reconstruction would be necessary to rehabilitate the evacuated
population and the economy of the region.
The main objectives of the reconstruction program, which
represented a clear commitment to long-range peace in the region, were
the reopening of the Suez Canal, achieved in 1975, and the renewal of
the three urban centers in the Canal zone.
-The goal of the Master Plan was that the Canal area and its
cities play a positive and increased role in the development of the
Egyptian economy and help relieve pressure on the rapidly growing and
overcrowded cities of Cairo and Alexandria.
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2.3.2.1. The Development of the City of Suez
Unlike the two other Canal cities, the history of established
settlement in Suez did not commence with the Suez Canal's construction
and opening in the 1860's. At first was a settled watering point on
the caravan routes through Sinai, then a Roman settlement, later
Egypt's Red Sea port nearest to Cairo. The opening of the Canal,
however, stimulated a constant period of development and growth for
Suez.
In the mid-1960's Suez was Egypt's third largest, and fastest
growing, urban area. By 1966, the city was experiencing an annual
population growth rate of some 4.2%, exceeding that of Cairo, and had
grown to 250,000 persons.
During the 20 year period up to 1966, half the increase in the
population of Suez was due to migration. Suez attracted 56% of all
migrants from Qena and Sohag, the two poorest and most crowded
governorates in Upper Egypt.6 4
Following the establishment of oil refining in the 1950's, the
1960's saw major development in heavy industry, notably
petrochemicals. Between 1960 and 1967, 15% of all government
investment in industry was in Suez, and wage rates were twice the
national average.
The workforce was employed in fishing and agriculture, port
activities (Canal Authority facilities, ship repair provisioning) and
tourism. The city had a substantial proportion of workforce employed
in industrial plants, a large fertilizer plant and a paper-making
factory.
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In 1967, the Egyptian Government evacuated the population of Suez
to Cairo and other towns in the Delta. The city had suffered
artillery damage in incidents which occurred in the late 1960's and
early 1970's and the war of 1973. Some 85% of all buildings in Suez
were damaged and 50% of the dwelling stock (25,000 units) was damaged
beyond repair.65 The population did not begin to return to Suez until
early 1974.
2.3.2.2. Main Features of the Suez Master Plan
The terms of the plan were forward-looking: to overcome the
immediate problems of war damage and to stimulate a continuous program
of reconstruction. A population of one million by the year 2000 was
aimed at; economic development was envisaged on a broad front
encompassing manufacturing industry, industrial and commercial free
zones, expanded port capacity, agriculture, fishing and tourism. This
was to be paralleled by the creation and improvement of social and
community facilities, and initially, by proposals for further
advancement of the reconstruction program (see Figure 4).
With the exception of the paper factory, the major prewar
industrial installations are either fully operational or well advanced
towards that state. In addition, a new commercial free zone has been
established as part of the revitalized port and a major new cotton
spinning plant has been opened. Many smaller industries have sought
to establish themselves in the city, but demand for serviced land is
far in excess of land available.
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In mid-1980 a survey suggested that the total workforce in Suez
was some 73,500, of which one third is in basic employment. The
growth of jobs is in general conformity with the Master Plan
projection, as is population and housing growth. 6 6
2.3.2.3. Key Development Issues for the City of Suez
The Suez Master Plan provides a good basis for future development
to major metropolitan size. Recent industrial and population
expansion are encouraging signs that population targets can be
reached.
A major government push in Suez City can lead to the development
of the city as large urban competitor to Cairo and Alexandria, enhance
the growth prospects of the Canal Region, and build a base for
subsequent growth in Sinai and along the Red Sea Coast.
There are, however, several constraints in achieving the
governments goals of including Suez as an industrial center in the
urban policies of decentralization. Industrial growth will demand
massive investment that is not currently available to the government.
Another constraint is that the army occupies large areas in Suez which
contributes to the difficulty of obtaining serviced land for
development.
2.3.2.4. The Development of the City of Port Said
The establishment of Port Said was associated with the
construction of Suez Canal in 1859. Port Said prospered as the Canal
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did and by the outbreak of World War I had grown to a city of almost
100,000 persons. The 1920's and 1930's were decades of growth during
which the city expanded as it became a city of traders, merchants and
shipping agents; it stood at the crossroads of east-west world trade
routes. The 1940's and 1950's saw Port Said in transition, becoming a
more broadly-based trading community.
At the outbreak of the 1967 War, when Port Said was a thriving
city of 280,000 people, its economy was still firmly rooted in the
Canal; the port, shipyard, and multiplicity of trades serviced both
the ships and their passengers and crew.
The economic vitality of Port Said has always been closely linked
with that of the Suez Canal. Thus, the closing of the Canal, during
and after the period of hostility, was a serious setback for the city.
2.3.2.5. Main Features of the Port Said Master Plan
Like the Master Plan for Suez, there were two main objectives to
encompass in the preparation of the Port Said Master Plan: to
overcome the immediate problems of war damage and to stimulate a
continuous program of reconstruction; and to prepare a planning
framework for the growth of Port Said to 750,000 persons by the year
2000.67
The means proposed to achieve the required expansion in
employment opportunities were as follows: (1) the promotion of a
successful industrial free zone development, concentrating on
manufacturing industries which could exploit the regional export
markets; (2) the development and upgrading of the city's port
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facilities; and (3) the realization of the agricultural potential of
Port Said's immediate hinterland, in particular the fishing potential
of Lake Manzala.6 8
Consideration of alternative physical growth strategies revolved
around the relative disposition of six key components affecting the
city's growth pattern: (1) the Suez Canal, (2) the port, (3) regional
transport links, (4) major industrial development, (5)
tourism/recreational activities, and (6) the urban living areas. The
growth strategy may be described as a strategy of natural expansion
with canal and port operations continuing on the present alignment and
with major urban growth confined to the West Bank, expanding in
parallel to the south, connecting to the regional and national
transportation links6 9 (see Figure 5).
As a part of the long term strategy, port industry and urban core
were planned to grow in a linear, parallel, direction to the
southwest, leaving the Mediterranean coastline and the Lake Manzala
edge free for tourism and recreational development. This allowed a
simple and direct relationship to be maintained between the industrial
areas and the residential areas to the south of the city. Land
reclamation for agricultural development could continue unimpeded and
so could the exploitation of the fishing in Lake Manzala to the west.
The Port Said Master Plan called for the creation of three new
industrial zones which were planned to create 3,140 jobs. It also
called for expansion of the port to three million tons by 1980 and ten
million tons by the year 2000. The development of resort facilities
in coastal areas (65 ha.) was among the study recommendations. The
Master Plan also called for reclamation of 6,500 hectares on the west
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bank of the Canal for agricultural purposes and 12,500 hectares on the
east bank (Sinai) after 1990. It also provided for the establishment
of a fruit and vegetable production area to the south of Port Said
(6,300 ha.). 70
Free trade city status was conferred on Port Said in January,
1976, and internal free zones were established for warehousing and for
industrial development as a means of stimulating the rapid growth of
manufacturing in the city. The free trade city status has resulted in
a dramatic upturn in the city's economic fortunes as a result of the
high level of investment that has been attracted to Port Said's free
zones.
Since 1976, there has been a rapid build-up of population as
families have returned to the city, attracted by the booming free
trade city. The 1976 census recorded 262,500 persons living in 52,000
dwellings following the reconstruction of the city in 1974. In
addition, there has been limited migration, principally by employees
associated with the free zone industrial and warehousing zones,
unskilled port workers and construction workers, from the Delta and
the Upper Egypt.71
The Master's Plan 1985 population was expected to be 740.000
persons. The construction of another 40,550 dwellings would be needed
to house the increase in population as well as to replace shanties and
old stock in the city.7 2
2.3.2.6. Key Development Issues for the City of Port Said
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The principal development constraint in the Port Said Region is
the lack of dry land for urban and agricultural development.
Virtually all land has to be claimed from Lake Manzala. Development
costs for urban land reclamation were estimated in 1975 at LE 35,000
per ha. or ten times that needed for agricultural reclamation per
hectare.
The ability to reclaim land from Lake Manzala at an economical
cost is critical to reaching targets for employment population growth
and future standards of development. To date, the Port Said Free
Trade Zone has attracted primarily transit-related development; means
must be found to attract or create manufacturing establishments.
Another possible development constraint for Port Said is the
supply of bulk water. Currently Port Said is supplied by the Abassiya
Canal. However, planned large-scale reclamation efforts west and east
of the canal, and urban development requirements in the other Canal
cities, the eastern Delta and New Communities northeast of Cairo, are
all competing for water from the same sources.
2.3.2.7. The Development of the City of Ismailia
Ismailia was established about 100 years ago as the headquarters
of the Suez Canal Authority, which it is still. The Suez Canal
Authority is the largest employer in the city. Other employment
includes small-scale ship building, light manufacturing and service
industries.
During the periods 1947 to 1960 and 1960 to 1966, Ismailia grew
at annual growth rates of 6.5 and 4%, respectively, indicating regular
and sustained growth.7 3
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Evacuees began to return to Ismailia in early 1974 and by the end
of the year approximately 132,000 had returned. According to the
Ismailia Master Plan, the city had regained a population of 175,000 by
1975.
2.3.2.8. Main Features of the Ismailia Master Plan
The main elements of the Ismailia Master Plan's strategy were
concerned with the development and settlement of its agricultural
hinterland and expansion of its service, commercial and industrial
(light manufacturing) sectors. It also called for the reclamation and
settlement of approximately 450,000 feddans (189,000 ha.) including
infrastructure networks primarily in the Salhia district north of the
Ismailia/Belbeis Road. Possible development areas on the west bank of
the Canal were also identified, but not suggested for reclamation
until the year 2000 (see Figure 6).
The Ismailia Master Plan projected future urban populations for
the years of 1980, 1985, 1990 and 2000 of 218,000, 275,000, 356,000,
and 560,000, respectively.
The Master Plan projected major population growth in its
agricultural hinterland, a large part of which is currently being
reclaimed. A hierarchy of towns ranging from regional subcenters to
market service towns to villages were planned for expansion or new
town development. The Master Plan estimated that the population in
these new or expanded settlements could be increased (from 43,000 in
1978 to 211,000 by the year 2000). In addition, the Master Plan
anticipated population increases in existing (1975) agricultural areas
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SOURCE:
and newly reclaimed areas of 220,000 and 263,000, respectively. Thus,
the total population of the Ismailia Master Plan study area, excluding
Ismailia city, was expected to reach 694,000 by the year 2000.
Study of soil survey results showed that reclamation of much of
the desert land between the Suez Canal and the Nile Delta north of
Ismailia was an economical proposition. Proposals were made for land
reclamation, cropping patterns and a range of settlement types related
to the agricultural potential and the type of settlers involved.
Employment growth targets were based on the support of small
industries, the building of serviced industrial areas, the development
of the Canal University, the transfer of some central government jobs
and limited development of tourism. 7
2.3.2.9. Key Development Issues for the City of Ismailia
Ismailia enjoys amenities afforded by Lake Timsah, the Great
Bitter Lake, and reclaimed arable areas along the Ismailia or
Sweetwater Canal. Ismailia has a good deal of potential for
horizontal expansion in desert areas to the west, north and south.
The development potential of Ismailia is primarily a function of
its locational advantages vis-a-vis the Suez Canal, Delta, Sinai and
its agricultural hinterland. The opportunities for land reclamation
are significant. The Ismailia Master Plan estimated that up to
450,000 feddans (189,000 ha.) could potentially be reclaimed.
Like Port Said, Ismailia's future development will hinge on the
availability of bulk water. Currently, the Ismailia or Sweetwater
Canal supplies potable water to all of the Canal cities, some eastern
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Delta settlements, and ongoing reclamation projects in the region.
Increased demand in new irrigated areas and new communities northeast
of Cairo and in Ismailia's hinterland could conceivably pose a
development constraint.
As Ismailia's economy is primarily service-oriented, there are
few large or small-scale industries. Industrial employment in 1980
only constituted about 12% of total urban employment. Those large
industries that exist are involved in food processing, the manufacture
of electrical equipment and clay tiles. Small-scale industries in
Ismailia include furniture-making, wearing appearal and steel
fabrication.
Ismailia's prospects for growth depend on its ability to become a
major service center for the Canal Region, the eastern Delta, and its
agricultural hinterland. Success in land reclamation in Ismailia'
hinterland will greatly influence the city's potential as a regional
service center.
Imposition of development constraints for light manufacturing in
the Delta is critical to Ismailia's potential in this sector. Agro-
industrial potential is also related to success in land reclamation.
2.3.3. Features and Regional Plan of the Red Sea Governorate
The Red Sea Governorate forms about one-sixth of Egypt's land
mass. In 1980, the estimated population was 83,300 persons; a density
of 0.39 inhabitants per sq.km., a very low density compared to the
Nile Valley and the Delta. The governorate has 800 km. of coastline.
The mountains in the area have some mineral resources. At the present
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time mining activities are limited mainly to extraction of phosphate,
largely because of the diffusion of the mineral resources, and the
lack of transportation and water. With increased provision of
infrastructure, greater prospecting activity may be expected.
While it does not play a major role in the economy of the
governorate, oil is its chief wealth. Ras Gharib is declining as a
center for exploitation; this activity is moving to Ras Shukeir, where
it may be sustained for a number of years.7 5
The governorate's fishing and tourism potential are the base of
development in the region. Six main zones offer the best potential
for tourist development and sea sport activities: Gamasa Bay, North
and South Hurgada, Quseir-Mersa Alam, Ras Banas and Mersa Abu Madd.
The Regional Plan for the Red Sea Governorate was started in
1978. It has provided a sectoral analysis of the development
potential of the Red Sea Governorate and the Red Sea coast. The main
objectives of the Plan were: to provide employment potential in the
region in order to attract migrants from the Nile Valley and to
develop the region.76
The Plan proposed a multiple increase in the level of public
investment in the governorate in order to raise the per capita share.
Investment programs were outlined for the following sectors: fish
exploitation, oil, mining, industrial development and tourism.7 7
In addition, investments to permit accompanying development in
human settlements and regional infrastructure were set forth in the
Plan - with emphasis on water supply projects and consideration also
of renewable energy resources. 78
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Among the principle industries recommended by the plan are fish
processing, building materials, chemicals (from phosphate),
petrochemicals (from Suez outputs), and a flour mill. The plan
suggested major expansion of tourist industry.
The plan also emphasized the availability of resources, port
facility potentials, and linkages with the Nile Valley as its key
advantages. The plan estimated that the Red Sea Governorate would
accommodate some 700,000 persons by the end of the planning period.
2.3.3.1. Key Development Issues for the Red Sea Governorate
Development constraints include the scarcity of rainfall and the
limited supply of ground water, which decrease the availability of
vegetation in the region.
Primary constraints for industrial development in the region are
the lack of water and the high cost of its supply, the shortage and
high costs of labor, the lack of cheap energy and the remoteness of
markets.
Other constraints include lack of infrastructure, transportation,
and communication. It will be extremely difficult for the region to
attract industry and population with such insufficient services.
2.3.4. Features and Study of the High Dam Lake
The High Dam Lake is the Egyptian part of the reservoir created
by the construction of the High Dam at Aswan. Completion of this
project has brought a number of benefits to Egypt through flood
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control, perennial irrigation and generation of a substantial portion
of the country's electricity.
Until now, however, utilization of the High Dam Lake and its
surrounding area has been minimal. In 1978, an integrated regional
development plan had been initiated. The specific area covered by
this study comprises the city of Aswan and the area around the High
Dam Lake. The project area extends about 300 km. from east to west
(see Figure 7).
The study emphasized the potential for agriculture along the
lakeshore, exploitation of fishery resources in the lake, extraction
of mineral resources and the fostering of tourism at recognized sites
around the lake. It called for further industrial development and
extended agricultural areas in the region. It also called for
emphasis on development of tourism and fishing.
The main objectives of the study were to investigate the degree
of viable economic development in the region in order to achieve
maximum population absorption.
2.3.4.1. Key Development Issues for the High Dam Lake
Development constraints are the extremely hot climate, especially
during the summer -- virtually no rainfall, the extremely low
humidity, and the wide diurnal and seasonal variations of temperature.
These climatic conditions are adverse to agricultural development and
human habitation. Water requirements for irrigation are high due to
high evapo-transportation. In addition, the capability of the soil
for agriculture in the area is low. Other development constraints
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include lack of infrastructure, transportation, and adequate
communication.
2.3.5. Features and Study of the Sinai Region
The Sinai region has a moderate mineral potential as it contains
manganese, copper, phosphate, gypsum, coal and oil. Such mineral
potential can provide the basis for employment opportunities in
industry. The region also has a tourism potential as it contains
attractive beaches. The peninsula, with nearly 61,000 sq.km. area has
a population of only 200,000 persons.
The Sinai Development Study started in 1979. The need for it
became apparent after the 1979 Peace Treaty, when President Sadat
identified Sinai as having the nation's first development priority.
7 9
The study objective was to provide early impetus to the
development of Sinai through the identification of technically,
economically, and financially feasible projects established within a
framework of a preliminary development strategy for the region. The
Sinai Development Study emphasized the development of the industrial
and the tourist sectors. It called for development priorities in the
centers and axes of El-Arish, the Canal Region, the Southern Gulf of
Suez and the Gulf of Aqaba coastline. Subsequent development would
expand outward from these locations.
Industrial development was proposed with good access to
transportation, convenient local support services and supplies,
compatibility with other land uses, ready availability of utilities,
and access to services of workers. Initially such development was
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proposed for El-Arish and later for El-Qantara, East Suez and the Abu
Rudeis-Abu Zenima area. Industry was the first main employment
sector.
Tourism was the second main employment sector. The two types of
tourism on which substantial growth would depend are warm water beach
tourism, along the Gulf of Aqaba, and regional beach tourism, around
El-Arish (see figure 8).
The emphasis of the longer range investment program was on
upgrading housing and community services, plus major water supply and
transportation projects.
2.3.5.1. Key Development Issues for the Sinai Region
The development constraint for the Sinai region is once again the
limited water supply. Ground water resources are limited. In Sinai
the better soil, which would have higher agricultural yields, tends to
be at a higher elevation in the eastern and southern portions of the
peninsula. The cultivation of such soil tends to be costly as water
has to be brought up to the land's level for irrigation. Lack of
adequate infrastructures, transportation, and communication are among
the major development constraints in Sinai.
2.3.6. Features and Development Program for the Northwest Coast
The most apparent and attractive aspect of the northwest coast is
that it borders on the desert, the Delta, and the Mediterranean Coast,
and thus benefits from the advantages of each. The region has a
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moderate climate and more rainfall than in elsewhere in Egypt. It
once formed part of the Nile Delta with the result that there are good
soils suitable for agriculture in many areas.
The region has large deposits of limestone and gypsum. Salt
recovery in the shallow parts of Lake Maryout has facilitated the
establishment of chemical industries in the region.
Another resource for future development in the region is the
Mediterranean Coast which has attractive beaches for tourism and
recreational activities. Tourism is spreading rapidly westwards as
large numbers of cooperatives have obtained development rights for
tourism projects along the coast. By the year 2000 the area between
Agami and Sidi Krier and El-Alamein will accommodate and provide
facilities for 285,000 visitors.8 0
Another factor that is contributing to the economic development
of the region is Alexandria's limited ability to expand in a southwest
direction across Lake Maryout. The rapidly increasing overspill of
industrial activities from Alexandria is moving into the northwest
region.
Since there were few employment opportunities in this area in the
past, until recently it was populated mainly by Bedouins, few of whom
were settled in permanent settlements. They were exclusively engaged
in sheep breeding as a livelihood. Many of them have now settled in
the region, together with an increasing number of migrants from other
parts of Egypt who have been attracted by new employment opportunities
created in the reclamation areas. There were a number of new jobs
created by development projects, particularly in industrial and
construction sectors.
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The Development Program for the northwest coast was initiated in
1981. The studied area is located between the 34 km. and 100 km. of
the Alexandria coast, with an area of 360 sq.km. The population in
1976 was 22,000 and was expected to grow to 26,000 in 1980.
Proposed developments in the region include the completed
S.U.M.I.D. oil terminal and future nuclear power plant in Sidi Krier,
a new sea port at Dekheila, a cement plant along the coastal road
north of Borg El-Arab, and a large inorganic chemical complex west of
El-Hammam. A free zone and a petrochemical complex are among the
larger projects now under construction. There is also a new
international airport that has been proposed for the area.
2.3.6.1. Key Development Issues for the Northwest Coast
The region has good development potential since water resources
are available, it has a moderate climate, and there is good soil for
agriculture. There is also a good base of natural resources for
industry. The closeness of the region to Alexandria provides a ready
labor supply.
2.3.7. Features and Regional Plan Study of The New Valley
The New Valley encompasses portions of two governorates, New
Valley and Giza, and includes the oases of Kharga, Dakhla, Farafra and
Bahariya. The area has a moderate amount of agricultural activity and
some mineral resources such as kaolin, phosphate and iron.
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The regional development plan for the New Valley area, which was
initiated in 1982, was based on its agricultural development
potential.
The New Valley Regional Plan called for a phased settlement
pattern, it included agricultural and nonagricultural activities, and
emphasized functional differentiation among centers. It determined
the infrastructure required to serve existing and future populations
and to initiate economic development, and it determined the
development of an outline of infrastructure that would link the region
to the rest of the nation.
The study identified priorities for administrative actions and
investments needed in the near future to foster growth in the region
and achieve long range goals. The Study defined projects and regional
priorities for immediate action, with particular emphasis on projects
that would stimulate local development initiatives, self-help, rural
development, and agricultural surpluses.
2.3.7.1. Key Development issues for the New Vally
Agricultural development potential for the New Valley dependents
primarily upon the area's groundwater resources and the cost of their
exploitation. Lack of infrastructure, transportation, and
communication are other development constraints in the area.
2.3.8. National Urban Policy Study
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In 1980, after the Egyptian Government began most of these urban
development strategies, the Ministry of Development commissioned
foreign consultants to prepare an urban policy for Egypt. The purpose
of the National Urban Policy Study (N.U.P.S) was to develop a
comprehensive set of policies to guide urban growth in the country
through the year 2000 in the light of current and future estimates of
urban population and the investment resources available to the
country.
During the initial stages of the study much of the effort was
devoted to the establishment of an adequate data base and the
development of a reinforced methodology for arriving at the
alternative urban patterns. A simplified model of the country's
economy was devised by means of which the total foreseeable sums
available for urban purposes, including the creation of non-
agricultural jobs, could be estimated up to the year 2000.
The next part of the study involved the development of six
alternative recommendations strategies for urban development, ranging
from encouraging relative concentration through counter-magnet cities
and the use of growth poles, to a strategy of dispersed settlements.
The study agreed with the Egyptian Government that there was a great
need to deter the conversion of agricultural land to urban uses and
that urban development should not come to the expense of future
agricultural needs of the country. Each of the alternative strategies
had implications in terms of overall costs, and the demand for other
resources. They differed in their capacity to create jobs and manage
growth, and in the extent to which equity among regions and population
groups could be achieved.
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Estimates for cost for each settlement strategy included two
major components: (1) the cost of creating new jobs in different
regions of the country, which took into account increasing marginal
costs when a city was projected to grow rapidly, and (2) the costs of
urban and regional infrastructure.
In the third and concluding phase of the National Urban Policy
Study the alternative strategies were evaluated by the consultants
both quantitatively (in terms of preliminary costs) and qualitatively.
As a result of this process, a preferred settlement strategy
incorporating various elements of the six original strategy
alternatives evolved. The basic regional and sectoral dimensions of
the N.U.P.S. preferred Strategy are the following:
- The exploitation of strong economic advantages of the Cairo and
Alexandria Metropolitan Regions to absorb a major portion of the
expected growth in urban population, while reducing concentration
in core areas. The study projected population for the year 2000
in Cairo to be 16 to 16.5 million and for Alexandria's population
in the year 2000 to be 5 to 5.5 million.
- A concentrated effort to support population growth possibilities
in the Suez Canal Zone with a focus on Suez City. Population
targets in the year 2000 were 750,000 to 850,000 in Suez, 400,000
to 500,000 in Ismailia and 550,000 in Port Said.
- A strategy of maintaining the expected spontaneous growth in
Delta cities which aims at limiting unnecessary extensions on
arable land while providing additional urban employment. There
was emphasis on Tanta and Mansoura with year 2000 population
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targets of 525,000 to 575,000 and 500,000 to 550,000,
respectively.
- An effort to include additional growth in an initially limited
number of Upper Egypt cities to develop an economic base for more
decentralization later on. Special emphasis was placed on
Assiut, Qena/ Naga Hamadi and Aswan with year 2000 target
population targets of 550,000 to 600,000, 325,000 to 400,000 and
4000,000 to 450,000 respectively.
- A project-by-project approach to the settlement problems of the
remote areas to utilize emerging technologies and establish
implementing institutions to increase the attraction of
these areas for human settlement. Major population increases
were not anticipated; year 2000 population targets for existing
main settlements of approximately 400,000 were projected.
- A choice of standards for housing and infrastructure service
levels that is affordable by a wider range of the population and
of a mechanism that would increase the proportion of public cost
recovery.
- Increased emphasis on the industrial sector in economic planning,
encouragement of private investment to conserve public funds, and
integration of spatial and sectoral planning though selective use
of direct industrial investment, and tax and non-tax location
incentives.
The settlement zones recommended for spatial emphasis as part of
the national strategy and their targeted population for the year
2000 are shown in Figures 9,10,11 and 12.
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FIGURE 10
LOWER EGYPT SETTLEMENT HIERARCHY
1976
DISTRIBUTION OF URBAN POPULATION
(BY SETTLEMENT OVER 50,000)
SOURCE: PADCO, National Urban Policy Study, Final Report, Vol. 1,
1982, pp.5.
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FIGURE 11
LOWER EGYPT SETTLMENT HIERARCHY
2000
DISTRIBUTION OF URBAN POPULATION*
(BY SETTLEMENT OVER 80,000)
SOURCE: PADCO, National Urban Policy Study, Final Report,
Vol. 1, 1982, pp.5 .
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Although the National Urban Policy Study provided the most
comprehensive analysis for aspects related to urban planning in Egypt,
the Egyptian Government rejected the findings and recommendation of
the study for undocumented reasons.
The government should have considered the N.U.P.S.
recommendations as the study was based on an economic analysis which
is crucial for the urban development in the country.
2.3.9. The Greater Cairo Region Long-Range Urban Development Scheme
As mentioned, Greater Cairo Region consists of Cairo Governorate,
some parts of Giza Governorate, the city of Shoubra El-Kheima in
Qalybia Governorate, as well as a few villages in the Nile Valley and
the Delta. The Greater Cairo Region Long-Range Urban Development
Scheme study was initiated In 1980. It was based on the belief that
the Greater Cairo Master Plan of 1968 should be revised and updated
within the boarder context of the National Urban Policy Study
(N.U.P.S.) and other recent studies. The study's objectives were to
provide a more current master plan to guide the growth of Greater
Cairo, establish the appropriate agency to administrate the plan, and
provide it with the resources to make it an effective tool in
controlling the region's development.
Consistent with the findings of earlier studies, the Long-Range
Urban Development Scheme recognized that the urban population of
Greater Cairo will be in the range of 16.5 million by the year 2000.
Thus a major task of the planning effort has been to consider means of
accommodating this number of people in an efficient manner, while at
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the same time reducing congestion in the region's core, increasing the
level of amenity throughout the Region, and curbing the prudent
conversion of agricultural land to urban uses in much of the
Region.81
The scheme identified sectors of the Cairo agglomeration that
have a tendency to break away and rather than reinforce their lines to
the central area -- to improve their capacity for self sufficiency by
reinforcing the tendency for geographic specialization in each sector.
These sectors would be called homogeneous as far as opportunities for
living are concerned.
Criteria for identifying homogeneous sectors within the existing
urban fabric and for extending the concept to future settlement areas
were as follows: a population of one to two million persons, a
minimum-employment to labor-force ratio of 0.80, an existing or
potential service center in each sector, where new services can be
organized and supported by adequate utility and transport systems, an
opportunity to recognize local transport systems within each sector
before improving regional links among different sectors, and an
opportunity to provide and maintain open spaces or physical barriers
between sectors in order to reinforce economic autonomy.
Within the Greater Cairo Region, some fourteen homogeneous
sectors, plus three protection sectors encompassing agricultural areas
were identified where urban development would be discouraged.
The concept of homogeneous sectors, with clustering of new
settlements, had provided the framework for three alternative
scenarios of future spatial distribution. Each scenario recognized
the absorptive capacity of the existing urban agglomeration in each
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sector and paid attention to committed projects on the periphery of
the urbanized area. Each scenario varied the emphasis given to
further growth. The first emphasized growth in the northwest and east
along the desert fringe of the Delta. The second emphasized growth in
the east and south (El-Amal and Helwan), and the third stressed a more
balanced pattern with expansion occurring both east and west of the
existing agglomeration. This last scenario was selected as the basis
for the final strategy plan (see Figure 13).
The construction of a ring road around the Greater Cairo Area was
one of the recommendations of the study and has been under
construction since 1983.
2.3.10. Other Sectoral Plans and Programs
A number of other smaller scale sectoral plans and programs were
prepared during the 1970's and early 1980's. Within the context of
the Greater Cairo Region Long Range Urban Development Scheme and the
National Urban Policy Study, there was an effort to establish overall
development policies and a framework of future urban expansion in the
Cairo Metropolitan Region and in Giza Governorate. The Land
Development Study for Greater Cairo examined land use and
infrastructure development issues for the region. The study focused
on public and private land ownership patterns in both agricultural
areas and desert areas, as well as on the feasibility of providing
infrastructure in desert areas to divert development pressures away
from agricultural areas.
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FIGURE 13
GREATER CAIRO REGION - LONG RANGE DEVELOPMENT SCHEME
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SOURCE: Ministry of Development, Summary of Programs and Potential for
Investment in Egypt, October, 1982, pp.d-16.
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The Master Plan for Giza Governorate provided a strategic plan
which forms a framework for a detailed structure for Giza City and its
fringes, a master plan for the urban areas in Giza City along the
Pyramid Road, and a pilot housing scheme for a large new housing area.
There were a number of plans prepared for smaller scale new
cities and in different parts of the country that need urban expansion
due to population growth pressures. Such projects included the
planning of a New Damietta City that is related to the New Damietta
Port development constructed near Damietta. This program also
included planning for New Ismailia City, New Salehia City and New East
Qantara City. Some of these new cities are now under construction.
There were also a number of new twin cities planned in Upper
Egypt. El-Shams City is in the Assiut Region, Sohag New City, Minia
New City, and Beni Suef City are envisioned as early steps in the
development of an urban corridor extending along the Eastern and
Western Deserts. Again, some of these new cities are now under
construction. Through the building of bridges across the Nile, the
attraction of population and activities to the eastern bank is
expected.
2.4. CONSTRAINTS AFFECTING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF URBAN POLICIES IN
EGYPT
In reviewing the ability of the Egyptian Government to carry out
specific urban policies, it is critical to examine certain constraints
on the implementation of these policies. Particular constraints
include settlement distribution, infrastructure, economy, and the
political and institutional capacity.
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2.4.1. Settlement Distribution
The distribution of water resources constrains the patterns of
urban settlements. Water resources are limited mostly to the Nile
River. This centralized settlement distribution pattern, 7,000 years
old, has fostered strong social attachment -- a pattern that will be
very slow to change.
The urban concentrated settlement in the Nile Valley and the
Delta, with high densities in larger urban areas, create development
pressures in terms of services provided in such areas as housing
supply, transportation, infrastructure, health, and education.
2.4.2. Infrastructure and services
There are large current deficits and large future needs in
Egypt's infrastructure and services. The country's vast desert
requires higher infrastructure expenditure per capita in order to
achieve spatial, political, and economic integration. The transport
system of the country is sufficient for serving only the existing
settlements, thus encouraging continued urban concentration. The
communication system is inadequate and technical information is not
readily available. If people are to be relocated to remote areas,
they will need improved services.
2.4.3. Economy
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The economic resources available and the national economic
priorities determine the range of national urbanization policies that
can be adopted.
Egypt's natural resources are limited to oil exports and some
minerals for local use. Other resources are the oil countries worker
remittances, the Suez Canal dues, and the tourism industry. All four
resources have been decreasing in revenues the last five years (see
Table 2). The economy has had difficulty sustaining a high growth
rate.
In the mid 1970's, the government began an enormous urban
investment program, partly to rehabilitate the capital stock that had
been neglected during the 1960's and early 1970's, and also to bring
about a higher level of output and employment. However, this desire
to increase urban investment has not been accompanied by much increase
in domestic resources for investment. Consequently, the program
cannot be implemented. Domestic savings performance in recent years
has been weak and below the level needed (without major foreign
contributions) to maintain high overall growth. The low productivity
and over-expansion of the large public sector, combined with a
nonselective use of incentives for private development has result in a
declining share of industry in the economic development. The
stagnated growth in agriculture is also contributing to the economic
crisis.
Excessive reliance on foreign financing exposes the nation's
investment plans to the vagaries of foreign economic and political
events. This is especially true when a substantial portion of foreign
investment takes the form of government-to-government concessionary
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loans and transfers. An investment program financed largely with
domestic resources will have a sturdier foundation than one relying on
foreign resources. If foreign funds are not used efficiently, the
risk will be even greater.
2.4.4. Political and Institutional Capacity
Indicators of Egypt's institutional ability to carry out policies
are: the degree of administrative centralization, the share of
central government expenditures in total public investment, and the
relative balance between public and private sector investment.
In Egypt, the central government has most of the control over
local government including decisionmaking and fund allocation.
Although the local government is responsible for the implementation of
policies, it has little input into the formulation of policies. For
example, some urbanization policies concentrate exclusively on the
problems of urban decentralization and ignore the fact that other
national economic policies (in such areas as trade, industry, and
infrastructure) provide strong incentives for people to locate in the
dominant urban region. Another traditional shortcoming in the present
urbanization policies is the stop-and-go application of policy
instruments according to short-range political or economic
circumstances.
In order to achieve decentralization in Egypt, it is crucial to
realize that planning of any region will not be effective if done in
isolation. It must be part of a national strategy based on the
comparative advantage to the local region as well as on a realistic
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appraisal of national resource constraints. Such a strategy requires
a high-level political commitment to a more equitable distribution of
economic activities throughout the country. But this commitment has
been lacking in Egypt.
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3. EVALUATION OF THE EXISTING NEW TOWNS POLICY
The New Towns program was adopted by the Egyptian Government in
1974 as a major component in urban policies adopted for
decentralization from the Nile Valley and the Delta.
This chapter will consider how effective the new towns and
satellite cities are -- and are likely to be -- in the deconcentration
of the population growth and the redistribution of economic activities
of the Cairo and Alexandria metropolitan areas by the year 2000. The
new cities will be evaluated on the basis of the following factors:
- Location
- Projected size
- Development costs and standards
- Population and housing stock
- Target group affordability
- Development control
- Organization and management required
3.1. LOCATION
The location of the self-contained new cities, which are far from
existing urban centers, is raising certain problems. Traditionally,
Egyptians are not desert dwellers, and the majority of urban centers
grew in proximity to bodies of water and rural hinterland. Such
proximity has traditionally served several important functions in
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Egyptian urban life. It has moderated the harsh environment, provided
a readily accessible substitute for public open space, nurtured close
ties between urban dweller and their rural regions, and provided
opportunities for income support and sources of cheap food supplies
(particularly for the new migrants and the poor). 8 2 The location of
the new self-contained cities will minimize such opportunities.
The sites of the new self-contained cities, impedes the desirable
linkage of the new settlements with an agricultural hinterland, which
contains 55% of the country's population and employs 50% of the labor
force. Thus in some cases the potential of the new towns to affect
the economic and social development of Egypt's rural population is
lost.
It has frequently been suggested that the new cities would
intercept migrants from the rural areas to existing cities. But the
location of the self-contained cities does not provide the appropriate
economic and social networks for those migrants. So they will
continue to flock to overcrowded Cairo and Alexandria.
The optimal distance for a city from the nearest larger or equal
sized city is one which maximizes the sum of agglomeration and
hinterland effects.8 3 Thus an urban center has better growth
prospects if it is either close by or far away from all
competitors.84 The location of some of the Egyptian new cities does
not seem to follow this rule.
All of the current new cities are further than 40 km. from the
nearest large city center. Sadat City is the least desirable
location, being 95 km. away from central Cairo and 75 km. away from
any present urban development. Tenth-of-Ramadan City is slightly
better located, 58 km. from Cairo.
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The situation is brighter with regard to the satellite cities
than the self-contained ones. These cities are located along existing
development corridors and close enough to Cairo to attract industries
and residential population. Fifteenth-of-May City has the potential
of attracting workers from industries in Helwan though current costs
of dwelling units are high. Sixth-of-October City is located in a
potential development area of the Giza Governorate, attractive for
both industry and tourism facilities. El-Obour City is located near
to the Cairo-Ismailia Corridor, near the Belbeis Desert Road and close
to the El-Khanka industrial site overlooking the Delta and closer to
Cairo than Tenth-of-Ramadan City. It is, therefore, more attractive
for industrial and residential development.
3.2. PROJECTED SIZE
Experience in other countries has shown that a new urban center
must be able to reach a critical mass of approximately 500,000 persons
in order to attract private industry and secondary jobs without the
need for public subsidy.8 5
Table 14 compares likely population sizes of the new cities in
the year 2000 (based upon past growth rates of urban centers in Egypt
and upon present development and construction plans of new cities) to
the target population. The table indicates that growth rates of from
8-24% per annum for the next 20 years would be required to reach year
2000 target population, however, such growth rates seem to be
difficult to achieve.
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TABLE 14
NEW COMMUNITY PROJECTED POPULATIONS IN YEAR 2000
AND IMPLIED RATES OF GROWTH
COMMUNITY
10th of Ramadan City
Sadat City
New Amerlyah City
6th of October City
15th of May City
BASE
YEAR
1983
1985
1985
1984
1985
TOTAL
BASE
POPULATION
20,0)0'
20,0002
20,0003
17, 5004
50,0005
- 127,500
ASSUMED MAXIMUM
AVERAGE RATE OF
GR0WTH PER ANNUM
10 %
10 5
10 5
10 %
YEAR 2000 POPULATION
PROJECT ION
AT OPTIMUM NEW COMMUNITY
HISTORICAL TARGETED
URBAN TRENDS 6  POPULATION
101,100 500,000
83,500 500,000
83,500 390,000
80,400 350,000
150,0007 150,000
498,500
IMPLIED ANNUAL
GROWTH RATE OF
NEW COMMUNITY
POPULATION
TARGETS
21 5
24 5
20 5
21 5
8 5
1,890,000
SOURCE: PADCO, National Urban Policy Study, Final Report, Vol. 1, 1982, pp.160.
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Even if the new towns reach the proposed size in the year 2000 -
it is doubtful that they will contribute to solving the problem of
concentration of urban population and industries in few urban areas.
For the next generation (or 15 to 20 years), it is probably not
feasible (or desirable) in most developing countries to stop the
spread of the growth of population of the giant cities (cities with
population of 500,000 or more); but it may be feasible (and desirable)
to lower their rates of growth in relation to the growth rates of
other urban centers.8 6 There are no examples of successful efforts to
stop the growth of these large cities or reduce their size. 8 7
Experience in developing countries shows that small cities cannot
compete with large ones. In most large cities, the central cities may
be growing less rapidly or even losing population, but their outer
regions are expanding enormously.8 8
There are two aspects of implementation of new towns. One is the
physical implementation of buildings, roads and services. The other
is the human element -- the population, the available jobs, the skills
and workers that make it up, with the physical elements -- the total
environment of the new town and ultimately determine its success.
In considering the human element it must be remembered that the
majority of urban population in Egypt is not very mobile for social as
well as economic reasons and might be unwilling to move. Strong
family ties in the Egyptian society lower the level of mobility of the
urban population.
The new cities still lack the adequate resources of city life,
such as qualified health-care centers, shopping facilities,
transportation and recreational facilities. They will remain new for
a long period of time.
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An influence that has a greater effect on labor mobility than the
influence of social aspects is the phenomenon of urban agglomeration.
All the important institutions, services, and industries of the
country are concentrated in Cairo. Moreover, the limited number and
kind of job opportunities in the new cities limit labor mobility.
Several studies on the costs and benefits of alternative
settlement patterns reveal that despite a number of negative
externalities and city size (congestion, pollution, psychosocial
stress and crime), there are also positive externalities. Urban
agglomeration economies include business agglomeration economies and
social agglomeration economies. The first refer to the wide range of
externalities associated with large cities that accrue to individual
firms. They include: access to specialized business services;
sources of capital, labor market economies (more varied skills,
greater elasticity of labor supplies, superior training, better
organized placement services), a larger stock of managerial and
professional talent, the presence of facilities, e.g., good public
investment, a cultural amenities, likely to attract professionals and
high socio-economic status groups, opportunities for specialization
offered by a large market (project specialization, technical
externalities, transport cost savings), economic in water-supply and
other public services, information and communication economies, and
greater adaptability and flexibility in the use of fixed capital.8 9
Among household agglomeration economies, mention should be made
of the opportunities for earning higher income, having a wider choice
of jobs and variety in housing, and the availability of shopping
facilities, public services, leisure and cultural amenities.9 0
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Social agglomeration economies refer to the systematic functions
of large cities and their contribution to national economic growth.
Foremost among these functions are the incubation of new industries
and their subsequent filtering-down to smaller cities. Other roles of
large cities are to act centers of innovation and as the initial
source of hierarchical diffusion.91
An outstanding supply of adequate housing and attractive jobs is
required to persuade families to relocate. People follow jobs and not
vice versa. Jobs are the most important requirement for the
development of an urban center. A critical mass of jobs must be
provided in order to achieve a rapid development of the new cities.
Based on the above, it could be argued that the government's
approach of new towns would only effect a small part of the urban
population and its economic activities. In 1986, ten years after the
construction in Tenth-of-Ramadan City had started, 95% of workers in
the city do not live in Tenth-of-Ramadan.9 2 A program marginal in its
effects, should not be very high on the list of the country's urban
investment priorities. The argument for creating the new cities is
further weakened when we examine the estimated increase in urban
population in the year 2000. While the increase in urban population
is estimated to be twenty million, only four million will be absorbed
in the new cities according to governments projections. There would
still remain sixteen million additional urban dwellers who would have
to be absorbed primarily by Cairo and Alexandria.
3.3. COSTS AND STANDARDS
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Perhaps one of the most intractable issues associated with new
cities development is costs.9 3 The costs of developing new towns are
significantly greater than the costs associated with contiguous urban
development.94
In general, the overall standards of the new cities regarding
level of infrastructure, community facilities, land efficiency and
housing are quite high when compared to current urban standards and
other urban projects being carried out by the government. The
estimated cost for the completion of Sadat City, Tenth-of-Ramadan
City, Fifteenth-of-May City, and Sixth-of-October City is
approximately LE 4650 million.9 5 As mentioned, the population by the
year 2000 in the new cities will not accommodate more than four
million persons while the increase in urban population will be twenty
million by the year 2000.
Thus, the new cities would require a very large proportion of the
capital available for urban investment, while producing a small return
with regard to the accommodation of urban growth.
As Table 15 illustrates, 5% of the total investment expenditure
and 14% of both housing and utilities expenditures for the Five Year
Plan period (1978 to 1982) were designated for the new cities, a
disproportionate amount considering the number of people served.
3.3.1. The Large Scale Development of the New Cities
Large scale development projects are difficult to execute in
developing countries which often lack the required number of
experienced contractors and adequate materials supply and equipment
needed to perform large scale undertakings.96
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TABLE 1.5
PER CAPITA INVESTMENT IN INFRASTRUCTURE EXPANSION IN EXISTING URBAN AREAS: 5-YEAR PLAN 1978-82
Reported Investment Expansion Invest-
(MLE) for New or Ex- ment divided by 2
Investment Average Investment panded services fnon- population growth
Category Annually (MLE) replacement) (LE)
Housing
Utilities
Water
Sewage
Electricity
Telephone
Other
Transportation
Education
Culture
Health
Total
208
380
62
165
135
37
4456
185
71
7
154
82
29
26
36
15
273
225
61
73
60
25
3
55
15
14
399879
5
26
91
25
23
665
1Based on project descriptions in 5-year Plan
2Assumes 18 million urban inhabitants growing at 3.25% annually.
SOURCE: Wheaton, William and Shishido. "An Economic Appraisal of the New Town's Policy in
Egypt," M.I.T. - Cairo University T.A.P. Program, 1978, pp.12.
It seems that it is difficult for Egypt to execute large scale
development projects involving such a large population and extensive
area of land. There are currently serious problems which cripple the
development of the new cities. Such problems are a result of the
imbalance of different stages of development in the various components
of the cities, As shown in Table 16, the stages of development
planned for the three self-contained new cities are for a population
of at least 150,000 each (a good-sized city). Even the Fifteenth-of-
May satellite City is planned for stages of 50,000 each, large scale
by international standards. For example, the size of the
developmental stages is in effect increased by the fact that often
work for a second is begun before demand is shown for the first.
It is more efficient to complete large-scale projects by stages
both in terms of time and available resources. One can then determine
if the project concept is correct before committing more resources.
New towns should be developed in stages of 50,000 persons or less. If
the jobs have been provided for that critical mass of population, then
the chances of increasing that population to 150,000-200,000 in
several decades and from there to the level of 500,000 are
significantly better.97
Another major problem now facing the new cities's development is
the severe shortage of adequate financing. During the 1970's, the
"Open Door" policy attracted foreign investment to the country. The
economy benefited from the oil revenues, the reopening of the Suez
Canal, the high remittance from Egyptian workers in Gulf countries,
and the tourist industry. All the above resources have been
decreasing greatly during the last two years. The country has a
substantial amount of foreign debts (see Tables 2 and 3).
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TABLE 16
NEW COMMUNITY PLANNED AND PROJECTED GROWTH RATES, 1981-2000
CURRENT
POPULATION
(1981 or
1982)
REQUIRED
ANNUAL GROWTH RATES
TARGET POPULATION TO REACH TARGET(%)
1985 1990 2000 1981- 1981- 1991-
1985 1990 2000
TENTH OF RAMADAN
CITY
SADAT CITY
NEW AMERIA CITY
6th OF OCTOBER
CITY
15th OF MAY CITY
5000
5000*
5000*
2000*
2000
150,000 224,000 500,000 134%
61,000 122,000 500,000 130%
28,000 153,000 390,000
68,000 132,000 350,000
78%
224%
50,000 .72,000 150,000 124%
NOTE:
* Indicates expected population in 1982. Lack of the Star indicated
1981 population.
SOURCE: Sherer, Samuel. "New Towns and Satellite Cities - A Strategy
for Decentralization of Urban Development," 1982, pp.16.
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COMMUNITY
53%
49%
53%
69%
49%
27%
29%
27%
33%
26%
Due to the long period of implementation required, few government
administrations have been able to see a project through to completion.
Government changes in ministries, staff, and top officials have
further slowed the momentum of such projects, as each new official
tends to alter development plans according to his own views and
political environment.
Policymakers should not be mesmerized by the prestige and
technological advances bodied by very large-scale projects, and as a
result tend to neglect the scope for less glamorous but cost-effective
small projects.
3.3.2. Infrastructure Standards and Residential Densities
The current new cities are characterized by high infrastructure
standards as compared to those of already developed cities. Combined
with low residential densities, these produce tremendous costs. Table
17 reports per capita costs of infrastructure in the current new
cities compared to other urban projects. These high standards exceed
the implementation potential of the country. The immense cost of
these comprehensive, high standard systems, bind scarce financial
resources which otherwise could be better used to develop other
projects and serve a larger number of population.
Tenth-of-Ramadan City has the highest cost standards. Its cost
of LE 1083 per capita for Stage One basic infrastructure is four times
that of any other urban project. To get an idea of how large these
per capita infrastructure costs are, several calculations can be made.
To begin with, if such investment levels were provided for each of
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Egypt's estimated 600,000 new urban residents annually, the yearly
expenses would be between 750 and 924 million LE. Egypt's Gross
Domestic Product is only 8,000-10,000 million LE, so roughly 10% of
GDP would be required to construct this infrastructure for all of the
incremental growth in population. The cost to every inhabitant is
even greater. Using an interest rate of 10%, the annualized cost per
person would be LE 120-150. Per capita income in Egypt is currently
around LE 175 (these figures are based on 1976 estimates). The
country would eventually have to devote 75% of its total output every
year to afford such infrastructure outlays. Clearly expenses of this
magnitude would create an enormous drain to the Egyptian economy.9 8
Table 16 makes it clear that the level of infrastructure planned in
the new cities is far higher than that which exists around already
developed ones.
Much of the above-mentioned difference in standard costs is due
to a low residential densities in the current new cities. As Tables
17 and 18 illustrate, of all the new cities, Tenth-of-Ramadan, Sixth-
of-October, and Fifteenth-of-May have the lowest gross densities
(ranging between 75 and 160 persons per ha.). Net residential
densities vary between 215 and 701 persons per ha. for the three self-
contained cities, and 386 to 618 persons per ha. in the satellite
cities. These densities are almost 50% of densities in other urban
projects in existing cities. These low densities prevent the new
cities from being compact enough so that most activities are within
walking distance. Such compactness would reduce the necessity for any
transport.
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TABLE 17
TOTAL PER CAPITA DEVELOPMENT COSTS OF NEW TOWNS AND OTHER
COMMUNITY STAGE POPULATION LAND INFRASTRUCTURE
URBAN PROJECTS (1980
COMMUNITY
FACILITIES - HOUSING
PRICES) (L.E Per Capita)
TOTAL
I.
II.
SOURCE: Sherer, Samuel. "New Towns and Satellite Cities - A Strategy for Decentralization
or Urban Development," 1982, pp8O.
NEW TOWNS
1) TENTH OF A4ADAN 1 150,000 - 910 1713 1111 3734
2000 500,000 - 1083 1713 1111 3907
2) SADAT CITY 1 41,900 741 505 903 2122
2000 500,000 - 671 1424 903 2997
3) 15th OF MAY CITY 1 24,000 - 594 254 1014 1862
2000 150,000 - 506 1696 1014 3216
4) 6th OF OCTOBER CITY 1 70,000 - 959 342 1725 3026
2000 350,000 - 851 619 1725 3195
OTHER PROJECTS
1) SUEZ CABANON PROJECT 2000 40,900 - 166 151 444 761
2) HELWAN NEW CO:MUNITY 1 30,000 452 990 1586 159 3184
(USAID) 2000 110,000 123 270 422 414 1229
3) DEUWAKA PUBLIC
HOUSING 2000 30,000 - 272 77 422 771
4) BERKET PUBLIC HOUSING 2000 250,000 - 272 109 660 1041
6) HELIOPOLIS COOP.
, HOUSING 2000 6500 646 225 NA 1816 2687
6) DELTA SETTLEMENT 400/
PACKAGE - hectare 1250 581.5 427.8 552 2811.3
7) AVERAGE CURRENT UNDER 140/
STANDARDS - hectare 3571.4 334.0 179.0 391.3 4489.42
8) MEDIUM HIGH DENSITY 280/
(1978 STANDARD) - hectare 1785.7 621.0 427.8 552.0 3386.5
9) TARGET STANDARD 104/
(SADAT CITY) - hectare 4840.0 1004.0 927.9 1042.0 7813.9
TABLE 18
NEW COMMUNITIES PER CAPITA INVESTMENT
(in 1980 costs)
(H) HOUSING
(I ) INFRASTRUCTURE
(S) SERVICES
PER CAPITA AFFOR-
DABILITY OF HOUSE -
HOLDS AT MARKET
RATES 1
2160
S -
(254)
INF
(677)
Los
OLDS
H
(1229)
POP. 24,000
PHASE: FIRST
15 T
3255
S
(1432)
INF
(594)
H
(1229)
150,000
FINAL
I MAY
3079
S
(394)
INF
(960)
2805
S
(619)
INF
853)
H H
(1725) (1333)
70,000 350,000
FIRST FINAL
6 TH OCTOBER
1882
S
(400)
INF
(952)
2390
S
(1424)
INF
(1617)
H H
(530) (349)
41,900 500,000
FIRST FINAL
SADAT CITY
(PER HOUSING INFRASTRUCTURE & SERVICES)
J/ ASSUMPTION : HOUSEHOLD INCOME AT 5O%..LE 1065, AT B0% - LE 1700 HOUSEHOLD SIZE 4.8;
LOAN TERMS; 12% INTEREST; 30 YEARS; PAYMENT 25% OR INCOME
SOURCE: PADCO, National Urban Policy Study, Final Report, Vol. 1,
1982, pp.165.
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3722
S
(1713)
3868
INF
(937)
H
(1072)
150,000
FIRST
10 TH
-4000
-3000
-2000
w-1000
0O
S
(1713)
INF
(1083)
H
(1072)
500.000
FINAL
RAMADAN
LE 892
800 OF HOUSE0
BELOWI
LE 558
50% OF HOUSEI
BELOW
3.3.3. Community Facilities Standards
The difference in costs for community facilities in current new
cities as compared to other existing cities are even greater than for
infrastructure costs mentioned above. Table 19 gives the per capita
costs for new cities community facilities and the same for other urban
projects. It indicates that the community facilities cost of LE 1,713
per capita for Tenth-of-Ramadan City,LE 1,423 per capita for Sadat
City and LE 1,512 per capita for Fifteenth-of-May City are over three
to ten times higher than the standards developed in other urban areas.
Table 17 further emphasizes the share that these standards costs
represent of the total per capita development costs - almost 50% more
than for other urban projects.
3.3.4. Land Disposition Policies
The ability of the new communities to finance themselves through
land development, either profitable sale or lease, is critical to
their development. If land is publicly owned and its price determined
by bureaucratic procedures, the cybernetic mechanism of the market for
setting prices, will not be achieved.9 9 Although public land
ownership could be a strong tool in land use development and control,
public land was disposed in some of the new cities even before there
were zoning regulations or detailed land use plans, and before land
subdivision and regulations were approved.
In Tenth-of-Ramadan City, a dramatic experience occurred in this
respect. For political reasons at former President Sadat's request,
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TABLE 19
PER CAPITA COSTS OF COMMUNITY FACILITIES IN THE NEW TOWNS AND OTHER URBAN PROJECTS
(1980 PRICES)
(L.E. PER CAPITA)
CW9NUNITY STAGE POPULATION EDUCATION HEALTH OTHER TOTAL
NEW TOWNS
1. TENTH OF RAMADAN 1 .150,000 643 228 842 1713
YEAR 2000 500,000 643 228 842 1713
2. SADAT CITY 1 41,900 242 20 213 505
YEAR 2000 500,000 610 321 493 1423
3. 15th OF MAY CITY 1 24,070 NA NA NA 133
YEAR 2000 150,000 609 466 437 1512
4. 6th OF OCTOBER CITY 1 70.000 NA NA NA 342
YEAR 2000 350,000 NA NA NA 619
OTHER URBAN PROJECTS
5. SUEZ(CABANON)
PROJECT 41,000 67 9 74 151
6. HELWAN NEW COMMUNITY 1 30,000 726 708 152 1586
(USAID) YEAR 2000 110,000 198 193 31 422
7. DEUWAKA PUBLIC
HOUSING - 30,000 NA NA NA 77
8. BERKET PUBLIC
HOUSING - 250,000 NA NA NA 109
9. HELIOPOLIS COOP.
HOUSING - 6500 NA NA RA NA
10. DELTA SETTLEMENT 400 PERSGNS/
PACKAGE - hectare 40.6 258.6 128.6 427.8
11. AVERAGE CURRENT 140 PERSONS/
URBAN STANDARDS - hectare 59.3 28.8 91.0 179.0
12. MEDIUM HIGH DENSITY 280 PERSONS/
(280 STANDARD) - hectare 40.6 258.6 128.6 427.8
SOURCE: Sherer, Samuel. "New Towns and Satellite Cities - A Strategy for
Decentralization of Urban Development," 1982, pp.78.
119
land was sold at an extremely low price. It was decided to announce
the sale of land in the city, at LE 0.50 per meter (LE .50 = $1 in
1977) and to LE 1.50 to LE 3.00 per meter for infrastructure according
to the size of land. 10 0 In 1977, the government sold a large part of
the city at a price not even close to the cost of provision of
infrastructure.10 1 One government official made the point that while
the Master Plan Study cost was two million dollars, most of the land
in the city was sold for less. 10 2
In 1986, land is sold at LE 30 per meter in Tenth-of-Ramadan City
(the highest land value in the new cities), while the cost of
infrastructure is LE 50 per meter, the government subsidies the
difference in price.1 0 3 Although Tenth-of-Ramadan City was planned to
be an industrial one, no priority has yet been given to workers in the
city regarding the allocation of housing. Obviously, it was not the
poor but the middle and upper classes who were able to take advantage
of this offer, many for speculative purposes. 10 4 There were 7,000
lots which had been sold in Tenth-of-Ramadan City in 1977 and 1978 of
which construction was started in only 600, i.e. only 7% of the total
land.105
The inevitable result was that speculators who bought the land
had no commitment to developing it. The government did not institute
any legal control, nor were the purchasers under personal or economic
pressure to do so.106
It seems that the government felt that these enormous subsidies
are required to encourage migrants to the new cities, but to date many
purchasers do not contribute to the new cities' development.
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Since the government owned the land it had a unique opportunity
to use this major asset both to control and to finance urban
development in the new cities.
The new cities authorities would be able to shape and control the
use of the land for a considerable period into the future: it could
reserve areas needed for public purposes, and it could capture for its
financing needs a reasonable share of the gains from rising land
values as the city develop. The latter benefit is important because
in Egypt, local communities do not levy taxes of any consequence on
real estate. The government should consider taxation on vacant urban
land which is held for speculation in many cases.
Previous studies had recommended that governments should not
sell land, but rather rent it in order to capture all future gains in
value likely to occur because of rising land prices. But since the
government's primary goal was rapid development, it did not aim to
adopt disposition policies likely to exert a strong drag on the speed
of development and, given the general investment situation in Egypt,
it was not likely to get many private developers to build either
residential or commercial facilities if it would not sell them any
land. The possibility of receiving capital gains from rising land
values was a major incentive for their participation in the
development of new cities.
The government should sell land to developers and maintain strong
enforcement of the speed of development. It should retain certain
well-located tracts so as to capitalize on future land price rises.
These tracts could be used as parking lots, playing fields, or parks,
or even rented to low-intensity commercial purposes involving minimal
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building coverage, until the government felt the time was ripe for
higher-intensity commercial development.
As to industrial land, the government should tailor its policies
to fit the needs of individual users and should adopt virtually any
disposition arrangements that would encourage industrial firms to
locate in the new cities. This industrial land should be manipulated
not primarily to make financial profits but to create employment.
3.3.5. The Cost of Public Sector Housing Component
The previous discussion has concentrated upon subsidies inherent
in the high standards of infrastructure and community facilities. Yet
there is also a large subsidy allocated for housing constructed by the
government. In Fifteenth-of-May City, the entire housing production
is constructed by the government. Construction is financed through
thirty years of government loans at 3% interest, while the present
real (prime) interest is 14% per annum. This low interest rate must
be considered part of the subsidy given by the government to the new
cities program. Such a subsidy results in an enormous amount of
investment tied up in housing.
It would be a more appropriate policy for the government to leave
the task of housing provision to the more responsive and efficient
non-government sector. The government's efforts could then
concentrate upon providing service to the land. Public efforts should
facilitate the supply of building materials, and provide small loans
and technical assistance to low-income groups.
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The government's public sector housing, as stated earlier,
supplies only 6% of all housing in Egypt. It has never been possible
for the government to meet the increasing housing demand. And the
target income level now represents those well above the median income
(in Cairo households LE 986 annually in 1982).107
The informal sector finances the largest share of all housing
produced in Egypt. The question becomes one of how the informal
sector can be productively brought into the formal sector of new
communities, while retaining its ability to respond to market forces
and produce housing affordable to the majority of the poor.
At present, the government cannot produce new housing without
heavy subsidies for target groups below middle class. The less
affluent are housed in existing cities in housing delivered to them,
made affordable by age, by the filtering process of the market. Since
new cities would lack a stock of older housing, government subsidies
will be high.
3.3.6. Cost Recovery
To date, limited action has been taken with regard to the cost
recovery of the basic development costs of the new cities. High
direct or indirect subsidies are apparent in the sales policies in
land, infrastructure, and housing. In theory, only Sixth-of-October
City is planned on a self-financing basis, but the level of expected
cross subsidy from land sales appears to be high.
As Table 20 illustrates, the lowest level of cost recovery is in
Tenth-of-Ramadan City. All of the residential land and 70% of the
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TABLE 20
EXPECTED COST RECOVERY BY NEW TOWNS
PER CAPITA EXPENDITURES PER CAPITA REVENUESI
TOTAL CAPITAL TOTAL SURPLUS
INFRASTRUCTURE SURPLUS OR OR
COMUNITY DWELLING (DEFICIT) (DEFICIT)
CITY POPULATION FACILITIES HOUSING TOTAL LAND UNIT TOTAL PER CAPITA L.E. MILLION
10th of Ramadan City 500,000 2,796 1,072 3,868 35 1,252 1,287 (2,581) (1,290)
Sadat City 500,000 2,041 349 2,390 222 903 1,125 (1,265) (633)
6th of October City 350,000 1,472 1,333 2,805 4,134 1,725 5,859 3,054 + 1,069
15th of May City 150,000 2,026 1,229 3,255 N.A. N.A. 1,408 (1,847) (277)
The New Communities Law exempts most development in the New
source of revenue for the New Towns Authorities. Further,
town development, the 1981 Cooperatives Law whIch excludes
Towns from taxation, which could otherwise be an alternative
since cooperatives are expected to play a major role in new
all types of cooperatives from local council fees removes
another potential source of revenue. Finally, the New Towns Authorities are too new to have established policies about
user charges, but If they adopt policies prevalent in other areas, these charges will be too low to recover capital
costs. Therefore, under present policies It is unlikely that alternative revenue sources can materialize which will
change this picture substantially.
SOURCE: PADCO, National Urban Policy Study, Final Report, Vol. 1, 1982, pp.166.
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industrial land in Stage One have been sold at low prices, so that the
amount of annual subsidy from the government has not fallen below two
thirds of the annual budget even in years when the sale of land was
the highest. 108
Based upon the estimated infrastructure and community facilities
costs, Tenth-of-Ramadan City per capita expenditures for
infrastructure and community facilities were LE 937 and LE 1713,
respectively. A total return from land sales of only LE 35 per capita
is anticipated. This represents a return of 4% on infrastructure and
1.3% on the combined infrastructure and community facilities costs.
Total revenue from land sales was approximately LE 5.25 million, as
compared to infrastructure costs of LE 136.5 million and community
facilities costs of LE 256.9 million (a total costs of LE 393.4
million).
Thus, there is an approximate subsidy of 98.7% on the costs, (a
subsidy of LE 388.1 million).1 0 9 The extremely low level of cost
recovery in the current new towns results in a sharp reduction of the
amount of capital allocated for investment in urban areas.
3.4. POPULATION AND HOUSING STOCK
The present housing production in the new cities contrasts
sharply with the proposed development programs. Current housing
production is falling behind schedule; it is unaffordable and
misallocated.
For example, a large number of employees commute to Tenth-of-
Ramadan from Cairo. They cannot yet live in the new city as the
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available supply of housing in the city is inadequate for their needs.
Public construction of housing has progressed at a slower rate than
scheduled and private residential construction has yet to start. The
misallocation of land resulted in land being frequently purchased for
speculation purposes. Also, the rate and type of housing construction
there are inconsistent with the proposed objectives. The types of
housing which have been built appear to be inconsistent with the needs
of the intended residents, employees in the city.1 10
While a basic objective in the development of the new cities was
to provide housing and services to those employed, that goal has not
been achieved. The housing construction is far from sufficient for
the needs of a large portion of the target population. Not only does
population growth fall short of original projections, but 70% of those
employed in the city, who are supposed to be the core of the
community, live outside the city. Even with housing construction far
behind schedule, unit upon unit of the built housing sits empty.1 11
In contrast to a First Stage of population of 150,000 as
initially projected, the population according to the official reports
was only 3200 as of March, 1982.112 Only 20% of the built units in
Tenth-of-Ramadan City were occupied. Only 40% of those units which
were sold are currently inhabited. 1 1 3 As of March, 1982, there were
4200 persons employed in the city.114 Of these, less than 30%
actually were living in the city (see Figures 14 and 15). The above
situation exists in most other new cities (see Figure 16).
3.5. TARGET GROUP AFFORDABILITY
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FIGURE 14
NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS MOVING TO TENTH-OF-RAMADAM PER YEAR
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FIGURE 15
HOUSING 1982 - FOUR NEIGHBORHOODS IN TENTH-OF-RAMADAM
SOURCE: Luchetti, Mary Jane Daly. "The Role of the Foreign Planning
Consultant: A Case Study of Housing in Tenth-of-Ramadam."
M.C.P. Thesis, M.I.T., 1983, p.67.
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FIGURE 16
ACTUAL PRODUCTION OF HOUSING AS COMPARED TO PROPOSED PRODUCTION
MARCH, 1986
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3.5.1. Affordability of Housing in the New Self-Contained Cities
In viewing the housing programs for the self-contained new
cities, about 37% of housing in Tenth-of-Ramadan City's First Phase
will be core houses designated for households below the fiftieth
income percentile (see Table 21). In Sadat City, the larger plots and
unit sizes will be predominantly affordable by middle-income groups
between the fiftieth and the eightieth percentiles. Housing for low-
income households in Sadat City is to be provided by small apartments
ranging in size from 25 to 47 sq.m. When the small apartments are
considered, 95% of Sadat City's housing options will be affordable by
income groups between the nineteenth and the seventy-ninth percentiles
(including subsidies). In Tenth-of-Ramadan, on the other hand, 63% of
its housing will only be affordable by income groups above the 76%
percentile.
Figure 17 shows graphically for both Tenth-of-Ramadan and Sadat
cities, the relationships between a given unit's selling price or cost
(in the case of full cost recovery) and the annual household income
required for affordability. It is apparent from the graph that the
majority of dwelling units are not affordable by households with
incomes less than LE 1,000 per annum - approximately the median
household income for Cairo. None of the dwelling types are affordable
for households with income below LE 1,000 at a full cost recovery.
3.5.2. Affordability of Housing in the New Satellite cities
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TABLE 21
ESTIMATED URBAN HOUSEHOLD INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN EGYPT
PERCENTILE
10th
20th
50th
80th
90th
INCOME PER ANNUM
L.E.
420
620
1000
1600
2200
SOURCE: Sherer, Samuel. "New Towns and Satellite Cities -
A Strategy for Decentralization of Urban Development,"
1982, pp.114.
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FIGURE 17
NEW TOWNS: DISTRIBUTION OF DWELLING UNIT TYPES COST ACCORDING TO AFFORDABILITY
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SATELLITE CITIES: DISTRIBUTION OF DWELLING UNIT TYPES COST ACCORDING
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Housing in the satellite cities of Fifteenth-of-May and Sixth-of-
October are even less affordable for those Cairo families with incomes
below the median. Figure 18 shows that none of the dwelling types at
Fifteenth-of-May City are affordable by households below the median
income (LE 1,000). The graph shows that the least expensive type of
unit costs over LE 13,000 and is affordable only for households with
incomes of almost LE 3000. This income level corresponds to the 94.7
percentile of Cairo income distribution. In other words, only 5.3% of
Cairo's households could afford the least expensive unit produced in
Tenth-of-Ramadan City.
3.6. DEVELOPMENT CONTROL
The public sector is the main developer in the current new
cities. It is hindered by the often-criticized bureaucracy, which
seems to be unchangeable under local conditions. Such development
projects often lack efficient management and responsible continuous
implementation. In Egypt we see the typical imbalance between the
ambitious aspirations of the national level urban planners and the
grass roots reality of local planning, implementation, and control
potential.
A long-run planning and action process can effectively accomplish
desired goals only if it includes frequent evaluation of how
successful it has been to date. Such an evaluation requires comparing
actual performances with those rates of performances needed to reach
the desired goals within the allocated time. Any particular areas in
which actual performance has fallen behind targets should be analyzed.
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This leads to revision of the goals, the action planned to attain the
goals, the methods of accomplishing the planned actions, or some
combination of these. Such a feedback process is essential if plans
are to become more than mere rhetoric.
There were only two follow-up studies for the new cities, one for
Tenth-of-Ramadan City in 1982, and the other is for Sixth-of-October
City in 1986. Both studies strongly recommend further evaluation for
current new cities.
3.7. ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT REQUIREMENTS
The simultaneous execution of all the new cities projects has
created a drain on the development potential of the country given the
number of other development projects that need to be handled. The
larger the size of the project, the more organization and managerial
skills required for successful execution.
There are indications that the size of the new cities is already
putting strain on the existing organizational capacity. The large
scale of the new cities projects makes it difficult for them to be
effectively controlled by the New Urban Communities Authority. Law
No. 59 of 1979 gives the Authority broad-ranging powers for planning
and control of development and management. However, given the scales
of the new cities and the size of each phase of development, problems
are already occurring in the coordination between the new cities'
projects and the governorates. For example, the Alexandria
Governorate is approving industrial and cooperative housing
applications along the main road to New-Ameriyah City. This fact can
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detract from the new city's potential for success, as such development
which was not included in the initial plans might have a negative
effect on the development of the new city.
Related to the above issue is the question of ongoing maintenance
of facilities in the new cities and the local Government
administration. Law No. 59 of 1979 and Presidential decree No. 351
of 1980 give the New Urban Communities Authority the power to act as
the local government for the new city until the city is delivered to
the control of the governorate. Fifteenth-of-May City, as a result of
the active construction activities, it is being considered to have
Stage One area (50,000 population) transferred to the Cairo
Governorate as soon it is completed, while construction continues on
the other stages of the city.
Experience in other parts of the world has shown that it is
probably better for the Authority to maintain control over the new
city for the entire period of construction, despite the administration
burden thus imposed. Only in that way is it likely that the uniform
development controls can be enforced, including the maintenance of
buildings by their owners as well as maintenance of community
facilities.
Local authorities of the new cities should have complete control
over the financial resources of the new cities' communities. Without
such control, the development of such communities will face
development difficulties.
This chapter has been an evaluation of one particular policy of
the current urban policies in Egypt. Because this evaluation of the
current Egyptian new towns has been to a large degree a criticism, it
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is necessary to make clear that it is not a criticism of the "New
Towns" concept in general, as I believe that such a concept could be
an effective addition to urban planning. But the building of such
communities involve massive efforts and requires enormous outlays of
capital with almost no prospect of financial return for a large number
of years which Egypt can not afford at the present.
This evaluation is based on the judgment that the current New
Towns policy will not achieve the Egyptian Government's goal of
decentralization of the population growth and economic activities of
the Cairo and Alexandria metropolitan areas by the year 2000.
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4. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Although it has been argued that large cities of developing
countries are more likely to generate net social benefits, the
Egyptian Government has assumed that Cairo's growth was undesirable.
Due to a population that exceeds ten million people, Cairo is facing
many problems in every aspect: housing, transportation,
infrastructure and other services. Furthermore, past government
policies in these areas have resulted in a primate city that is
completely mismanaged.
The long history of centralization in Egypt, coupled with large
population growth and poor management of the economy has lead to high
concentration of population and economic activities in the Nile Valley
and the Delta, especially in the two largest cities of Cairo and
Alexandria. In turn, this urban concentration and the urbanization of
agricultural land are the two factors propelling the Egyptian
Government to develop decentralization policies.
Decentralization policies since 1974
The decentralization policy that the Egyptian Government adopted
in 1974 involved the construction of eight new towns, of which three
are self-contained and five are satellites of Cairo. The government
also considered the development of the remote areas outside the Nile
Valley and established plans for the development of the Suez Canal
Zone, the Red Sea Coast, the High Dam Lake, the Sinai Region, the
Northwest Coast of Alexandria and the New Valley of the Western
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Desert. The common development constraint for almost all these plans
was the capital required to finance the economic and infrastructural
development of these regions.
The major constraints affecting the implementation of recent
urban policies in Egypt are: the current urban and rural settlement
distribution (which is determined by limited water resources), the
lack of infrastructure and services outside the Nile Valley and the
Delta, the current troubled economy and the insufficient institutional
capacity.
The decentralization policy that has been adopted by the
government is not achieving its goals in the planned time-frame. The
twenty-six years between 1974 and the year 2000 is much too short a
span of time to achieve the government's goals of decentralization.
Egypt has to tackle its urban problems over a longer period of time.
The main mistake at the implementation stage was that the
government was eager to pursue fast development simultaneously in
several regions, many of them remote; such development required a
large amount of capital. The government incurred huge debts to finance
such mammoth projects and to create a strong political image in the
country.
The implementation of urban policies in Egypt should be scaled-
down and pragmatic, rather than based on an ambitious optimization
approach aiming to achieve an urban equilibrium at one stroke. The
government designed urban policies for a vast spatial territory,
mistakenly believing that it could attain promising short-range
results of decentralization. The government should re-assess the
process of spatial transition and moderate the rate and impact of
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extreme spatial shifts (from extreme centralization to extreme
decentralization).
There has been no explicit national urban policy with an overall
framework, but rather individual strategies for different regions that
have not existed in a national framework. Scattered urban development
projects aiming at decentralization without an overall national plan
are hard to coordinate efficiently. They must be part of a national
strategy and based on the comparative advantages of the region, as
well as on a realistic appraisal of national resource constraints.
Even though the decision to build and the process of construction and
implementation of the current urban policies were started in 1974, it
was only in 1980, after substantial capital and effort was devoted to
the development of these policies, that the government instituted a
National Urban Policy Study. A national urban policy study should
have been planned first in order to provide an integrated planning
framework for the entire nation.
Since 1974, government's urban policies have concentrated
exclusively on the problems of urban decentralization and have ignored
the fact that national economic policies (in such areas as trade,
industry, and infrastructure) provide strong implicit incentives to
locate in the dominant urban region. If cities other than the capital
are not efficiently and effectively managed, their chances of
attracting industry and migrants away from the capital region are very
limited.
Cairo is still the center of culture and innovation, politics,
administration, and economic power -- it has service advantages over
11 other urban areas -- and therefore is still attracting population.
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It is important for the government to realize that city size is a
result of the role the city plays in the country's economy.
Any attempts to reduce Cairo's size will fail unless coupled with
other policies of channeling some of its economic and administrative
activities to other urban areas.
Financing the urban policies was projected from a sudden increase
in foreign exchange from resources such as increased oil prices,
workers? remittances, Suez Canal dues, foreign investments and
tourism. These financial plans did not consider the consequences of
the disruptions in such sources. Financial shortages during
implementation, particularly in the case of the new towns, have
resulted in delays, confusion, and higher costs.
The high development standards adopted in the government's
current development strategies will result in a drainage of the monies
available for investment in Egypt in the future. High standards could
have been maintained successfully if the number of cities built was
limited to only one or two rather than eight.
The abrupt, large-scale implementation of the New Towns policy
without piloting it created major problems. Construction of these
eight new towns all at once was like producing goods without prior
marketing analysis or experimentation. The location of some of the
new towns, costs and standards, housing policies, and development
control are hindering the achievement of projected population targets
for these towns. Project evaluation of the current programs of the
new towns was not provided ahead of time. Evaluations were performed
too late, if at all, thus controlling the cities's activities and
integrating them with national targets did not occur.
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The financial analysis or scheme for the new towns was neither
clear nor accurate. Financial returns from these towns were not
identified and costs were very high due to the large quantity and high
quality standards of the cities. The urban policies were based mostly
on demographic aspects (target population), while they should have
been based for the most part on economic aspects, in terms of costs
and benefits, as well as on future returns and the trade-offs
involved.
In summary, the short time-frame, the lack of a national urban
policy, the high development standards and the flawed financial
analysis all created problems in implementing the decentralization
policy.
Suggestions for future decentralization policies
While Egypt is facing urban concentration, it is also facing the
challenges of promoting national economic growth and full utilization
of its resources, yet at the same time it must promote regional equity
and avoid or reduce excessive development disparities. These two
objectives are in conflict with each other, particularly within a
long-range development perspective. They require coordinated economic
and spatial development policies and plans, at both regional and
national levels, for an efficient distribution of population and
economic activities.
The success of future decentralization in Egypt will depend on
economic policies adopted by the government. It is crucial for the
Egyptian Government to realize that an effective framework for urban
policies requires integration of economic and social development
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objectives, sectoral and spatial impacts, and short-range and long-
range goals. Such integration requires a high degree of clarity,
articulation and commitment on the part of policymakers of different
levels and sectors of government.
In Egypt, political objectives promulgated by urban strategies
are frequently in conflict with the forces created by national
economic policies. Thus, while efficiency-oriented economic plans
tend to be spatially biased, urban policies tend to underestimate the
power of economic linkages and social forces, or to ignore their
economic and institutional limitations. Integrating economic and
urban policies, therefore, requires better government understanding of
the consequences and limitations of the trade-offs involved.
Economic decentralization will succeed in Egypt only if inter-personal
and inter-regional inequalities are low, local government is strong,
and locational and resource endowments are high.
To Plan means to think of problems before they occur; it should
be seen as both innovation and preventive maintenance. Most of the
urban policies in Egypt however, have been a combination of neglect
and patch-up remedies.
The government's understanding of primacy and urban population
concentration and the timing and conditions under which they occur has
significant implications for the government's ability to predict
future urban challenges and to design appropriate, flexible, long-
range policies to face them.
National strategies of urban development will be seriously
handicapped until the resources and capabilities of local governments
are strengthened. The local government structure in Egypt needs to be
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strengthened if it is to carry out its role in planning, execution and
enforcement of sectoral development projects. The government must
also improve training programs for public servants. Similarly, it
must increase financial resources at each level of local government to
facilitate urban policy implementation. Local governments lack
adequate power and resources to effect major changes within their own
boundaries.
The government should give full authority to each governorate to
strengthen its local power and to control the wealth of its territory.
Through such autonomy, future development can be motivated on the
local level. The strategy for lightly-populated areas should be based
on high pay-off investment opportunities on a project-by-project
basis, rather than on a full regional development program to reach
sizeable pre-determined target population objectives.
The government can also consider the change of boundaries of
Upper Egypt's governorates. These governorates whose expansion is
limited to the Nile Valley, could be enlarged by adding extra urban
land from the surrounding desert. Such a change of boundaries,
through enlarging the land under control of different governorates,
would result in more resource allocation within each governorate.
The agricultural sector has been badly mismanaged for many years.
Nationalization, pricing control policies, and non-enforcement of
violations of the conversion of arable land to urban uses have caused
a severe land fragmentation and a stagnation of agricultural activity,
and hence have promoted migration to larger cities. The government
should pursue vertical and horizontal production and there should be
more enforcement of laws protecting arable land.
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A key component of urban policies in Egypt should be the
promotion of some of its secondary cities. Secondary urban centers
can be strengthened through appropriate transportation policies,
industrial estate policies, and, most important perhaps, the
systematic development of organizational and information networks
between these cities and the capital region. For example, banking
networks, industrial and professional associations, and administrative
structures should be promoted. Policymakers should not be mesmerized
by the prestige and technological advances embodied in very large-
scale projects, and as a result neglect the opportunities for less
glamorous but cost-effective small projects. The indicators of
economic development potential should include some of the following
variables:
- Population size of the city and its hinterland, intended as
a crude measure of agglomeration economies
- Measures of economic structure
- Industrial development potential
- Strength and diversity of the service sector
- Attraction for and, accessibility to migrants
- Depth of the regional resource base
- Quality and level of public services
- Fiscal strength of local government
- Supply of indigenous entrepreneurship
These secondary urban centers should not be built on agricultural
land. There are some locations in the Delta where land is not
adequate for agricultural uses -- for example, some areas of Kafr El-
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Sheikh Governorate. Also, twin cities can be built on the Eastern
Bank of the Nile across from Beni Suef, Minia, Assiut, and Sohag.
Located close to the agricultural hinterland, agro-industrial projects
can be constructed in these areas. Government intervention in
development should be limited to establishing the infrastructure and
initiating industrial projects in these areas. The government's
efforts should not include the task of producing housing supply. This
task should be left to the formal and the informal private sectors;
government can facilitate the task through technical training and
financial assistance.
The government should form a group to evaluate the current urban
policies and recommend how it would be possible to reshape them in the
future. The government should also develop adequate principles for
selection criteria for future development.
All the above conclusions are applicable to Egyptian urban
policies in general. The following are additional conclusions related
directly to the new towns and can be summarized as follows:
Since capital and effort have already been invested, it is not
economically wise to withdraw now from implementing these towns. New
urban settlements must be viewed as innovative laboratories for
testing and development of technological, social, economic, and
institutional and other reforms which might be applicable to the
expansion and rebuilding of existing cities. The new towns should be
a tool for introducing policies that are different from those which
exist in current urban areas. Such policies should aim at the
modification of current laws in order to attract investors and
migrants, and hence promote development.
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Recommendations which might be helpful in improving the situation
of the new towns can be briefly summarized in the following points:
- Detailed financial analysis for future returns will have to
take place for each city.
- Agriculture and agro-based industries have to be promoted.
- Programs for training farmers for mechanized irrigation
systems have to be initiated.
- Communications and services should be improved.
- Local control by residents must be provided.
- Statistical analysis for various aspects of the city's
development should be provided.
- Integration of the informal and the formal private sectors
should be investigated.
The role of the state is dominant in Egypt. The government has
an inevitable influence through its policies, its choice of the
location of infrastructure investment, and the public enterprises that
it controls. It must clarify its objectives and strategies. A well
thought-out strategy is a requirement for more rapid and satisfactory
progress.
Choices of national urban development strategies will be
determined in the political arena. Since national urban development
strategies take a long time to implement, the commitment to
geographical redistribution policies has to be maintained from one
government to the next. Obtaining consensus among the key political
groups is critical in order to prevent the strategy from being
undermined by rapid shifts in objectives and policies.
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It is critical to realize that the realities of system linkages
and resource constraints in developing countries will always force
upon us the central issues of planning: the pressure of trade-offs,
the need to systematize priorities in a dynamic and responsible way,
and the balance between satisfying immediate needs and maximizing
long-range achievements.
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